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Abstract 
In the first chapter I study the effects of oil price shocks on economic activity at the U.S. 
state-level, an innovative feature of this dissertation.  States which rely more heavily on 
manufacturing or tourism are more adversely affected by adverse oil price shocks, while states 
which are major energy producers either benefit or experience insignificant economic changes 
from historically large oil price increases.  Additionally, oil price increases from 1986 to 2011 
have not impacted state-level economies to the same degree as increases from 1976 to 1985.  
This discrepancy can be attributed to a fundamental change in the structure of the U.S. economy, 
for example, a declining manufacturing sector or an increase in the efficiency with which energy 
is used in the production process.   
In the second chapter I explore the effects of alternative measures of energy price shocks 
on economic activity and examine the relative performance of these alternative measures in 
forecasting macroeconomic activity.  The alternative energy prices I consider are: gasoline, 
diesel, natural gas, heating oil and electricity.  I find that alternative measures of energy price 
shocks produce different patterns of impulse responses than oil price shocks.  The overwhelming 
evidence indicates that alternative energy price models, excluding a model containing gasoline 
prices, outperforms the baseline model containing oil prices for many states, particularly at short-
to-mid forecast horizons.    
In the third chapter, which is coauthored with Lance Bachmeier, we determine whether 
accounting for oil price endogeneity is important when predicting state-level economic activity.  
We find that accounting for endogeneity matters for in-sample fit for most states.  Specifically, 
in-sample fit would be improved by using a larger model which contains both regular oil price 
and endogenous oil price movements.  However, we conclude that accounting for endogeneity is 
not important for out-of-sample forecast accuracy, and a simple model containing only the 
change in the price of oil produces equally accurate forecasts.  Accounting for endogeneity is 
particularly important in an environment in which rising oil prices were caused by a growing 
global economy, such as in the years 2004-2007.         
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Chapter 1 - U.S. State-Level Effects of Oil Price Shocks on 
Economic Activity: How the Oil Price-Macroeconomy Relationship 
Has Changed 
 Introduction 
One of the important research questions in macroeconomics the past three decades has 
been identifying how and why oil prices affect the economy.  Most empirical research has used 
measures of aggregate economic activity.  However, the U.S. economy is very diverse, with 
different regions relying on different forms of economic activity, such as the Great Lakes 
depending on manufacturing and the Great Plains depending on agriculture.  Consequently, there 
is much more variation in the responses of different states through time than there is using 
aggregate data.  This cross-sectional variation can then be used to answer some of the important 
outstanding questions in the literature, such as the importance of oil price endogeneity and the 
weaker economic responses to more recent oil price shocks.  To my knowledge, I am the first to 
analyze the macroeconomic response to oil price shocks for all 50 U.S. states.  I find that, over 
the period 1976 to 2011, states which rely more heavily on manufacturing or tourism are more 
adversely affected economically, while states which rely more heavily on energy production 
benefit or experience small economic changes after historically large oil price shocks. 
Regression analysis reveals that the relative size of the manufacturing industry and the oil and 
natural gas extraction industry in each state are significant factors in determining the response 
after an oil price shock.  These findings coincide with Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), Lee and Ni 
(2002), Hamilton (2009) and others, who find that durable goods industries, particularly 
automobiles, suffer the most in the months following an adverse oil price shock.  
The period from the 1970s to the early 1980s was a time of rising oil prices, but after the 
collapse of the oil market in 1986 the market has experienced increased volatility.  In addition, 
the high oil prices in the early period are thought to be a result of supply and speculative oil 
disruptions, and the high oil prices in the later period are thought to be a result of a growing 
global economy.  Therefore, I examine the difference in economic responses between the two 
periods and find larger changes in both economic activity and unemployment during the early 
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period.  I show this can partly be explained by the declining importance of manufacturing as a 
share of GDP in many states over the last 35 years.  
Kilian (2009) puts particular emphasis on the rising oil prices from 2002 to 2007, which 
can be thought of as a period of aggregate demand oil price shocks caused by a growing global 
economy.  As a result, it is believed that rising oil prices during this period did not have 
detrimental effects on the U.S. economy.  Consequently, I examine the economic response to 
aggregate demand oil price shocks in leading exporting states, but find sparse evidence of oil 
price shocks from 2002-2007 having positive economic effects.     
I find evidence of asymmetric responses to oil price movements by using separate 
indexes containing only increases or decreases in the price of oil.  In general, oil price increases 
have detrimental effects on economic activity, but oil price decreases do not have the same type 
of positive effect on economic activity.  Future research examining the effects of oil price shocks 
should employ the separate indexes to get more accurate results. 
 Literature Review 
For decades the relationship between energy prices and the macroeconomy has been 
studied in great detail, with Hamilton (1983) noting that all but one of the recessions in the U.S. 
between 1947 and 1981 have been preceded by oil price shocks.  To check whether the oil price 
shocks are exogenous, Hamilton (1983) uses Granger-causality tests and finds that oil prices 
Granger-cause GNP and unemployment, but other macro variables such as price deflators, 
wages, or the money supply do not Granger-cause oil prices from 1948 to 1972.  Therefore, it 
appears that oil price shocks play some role in explaining U.S. recessions.  Mork (1989) 
investigates whether the correlation between oil prices and GNP continues to be strong post 
World War II with data up to 1988, which includes the collapse of the oil markets in 1985.  He 
finds that the negative correlation of oil price increases and GNP persists through 1988, and that 
there appears to be asymmetric responses to oil price increases and decreases.  In contrast, 
Hooker (1996) notes that the oil price macroeconomy relationship is considerably weaker in the 
OPEC period from 1973 to 1994 than it was from 1948 to 1973.  Consequently, he concludes 
there was a structural break in 1973 between oil prices and macroeconomic variables such as 
GDP or unemployment.  This structural break indicates that there has been a fundamental change 
in the transmission of oil price shocks to the economy.  In response, Hamilton (1996) notes that 
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many of the oil price increases post-1973 have been corrections to previous declines in oil prices, 
which the economy will respond to differently than typical oil price shocks.  Thus, he suggests 
using the net oil price increase (NOPI), which only shows net increases in oil prices over a 
certain period of time, such as one year or three years.  Using the NOPI and more recent data, the 
negative relationship between oil prices and output is still strong. 
Valuable information can be gained from examining disaggregate or industry-level data. 
In a study explaining why oil shocks do not cause inflation, Bachmeier and Cha (2011) use 
disaggregate inflation data on consumer expenditures and find that variation across sectors 
provides information not found in the aggregate data.  Similarly, in examining oil price shocks 
and industrial production, Herrera, Lagalo, and Wada (2010) suggest that their findings of 
asymmetric responses to oil price changes would be hidden by analysis using aggregate data. 
There are many findings that show oil price shocks tend to have negative impacts on the 
economy, but there is not much in the way of explaining the transmission mechanism.  Oil price 
shocks may directly impact production costs, which could lead to lower production and output 
levels.  Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) document that employment declines the most in capital 
and energy intensive industries following an oil price shock.  In addition, they find that oil price 
shocks generate bigger employment responses in durable goods industries.  Lee and Ni (2002) 
find similar results showing that oil-intensive industries reduce supply in response to an oil price 
shock, and consumer durable industries such as household furniture, household appliances, and 
automobiles experience a decrease in demand due to an oil price shock.  This finding is 
confirmed by Kilian (2007), who reports a one-year energy price elasticity for consumption 
expenditures of -0.47 for durable goods and -0.84 for vehicles during the period 1970 to 2006.  
Hamilton (2009) also concludes that declines in the automotive and related industries explain a 
great deal of past U.S. economic downturns.  For example, if the motor vehicles and parts 
industry component of GDP had zero change during the oil price shocks of 1979-80 and 1990-
91, then average GDP growth during those times would have been positive.  Based on all of the 
previously cited papers that state the importance of the motor vehicle and parts industry 
following oil price shocks, one would expect to find that states with heavy reliance on this 
industry should have the largest deceases in economic activity following oil price shocks.  
Although durable goods consumption seems to explain a large portion of the economic response 
to oil price shocks, there are other avenues through which the economy is affected.  Kilian 
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(2007) reports that energy price shocks adversely affect restaurant and lodging expenditures, as 
well as the sale of airline tickets.  It would seem intuitive then that states which rely heavily on 
tourism would experience a decline in economic activity following an oil price shock.  Fed 
chairman Ben Bernanke echoed many of the above findings when he stated that oil price shocks 
reduce household income and spending (Bernanke 2006).    
Although oil price shocks typically seem to be a detriment to the economy, is it possible 
for oil price shocks to have positive effects?  A handful of states are responsible for most of the 
energy production in the U.S., and when energy prices rise more revenue is generated in those 
states, and firms will expand production.  Kilian (2007) examines one-year energy price 
elasticities for investment expenditures from 1970 to 2006 and finds a value of 1.39 and 2.13 for 
mining structures and mining and oil field machinery, respectively.  Consequently, states with an 
economy that relies on energy production might experience higher economic activity in response 
to an oil price shock.   
Another important consideration of the effect of oil price shocks is how they affect the 
consumer psyche and not just consumer income.  Hamilton (2009) finds that energy price shocks 
that reduce disposable income by one percent decrease consumer sentiment by 15 percent.  
Clearly, rising oil prices will sour consumer confidence in the economy.  Edelstein and Kilian 
(2009) address four ways that energy price shocks alter consumer spending: they reduce 
discretionary income, create uncertainty about future energy prices, increase precautionary 
savings, and via an operating cost effect cause complimentary goods to energy to be consumed in 
lower quantities.  The authors use shocks to consumers’ purchasing power driven by energy 
price fluctuations to quantify the effect of the purchasing power shock on various consumption 
categories.  They find that durables, and motor vehicles in particular, have the largest decline in 
expenditures due to a purchasing power shock.     
Until recently, the literature has assumed that oil price shocks were exogenous, usually 
stemming from supply disruptions abroad.  Specifically, Hamilton (2009) examines the oil price 
shocks of 1973-74, 1978-79, 1980-81 and 1990-91 and finds that all four episodes experienced a 
substantial decrease in oil production, thus causing Hamilton to proclaim that previous oil price 
shocks were primarily caused by supply disruptions from exogenous geopolitical events. 
However, if oil prices are endogenous and influenced by global demand, then this would imply 
different implications for the effect on the macroeconomy.  Kilian (2008) shows that many of the 
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recent increases in oil prices were driven primarily by global demand, with exogenous supply 
disruptions accounting for only a small fraction of the increase in oil prices.  Kilian (2009) 
decomposes oil price shocks into three categories: crude oil supply shocks, global aggregate 
demand shocks, and precautionary demand shocks.  He then goes on to show that many of the oil 
price shocks in recent decades, especially the 2000's, have been driven primarily by global 
aggregate demand and precautionary shocks, which explains why recessions have not occurred 
after these episodes. 
 Data 
Typically GNP or GDP is used to gauge economic activity in empirical studies involving 
energy price shocks, such as Hamilton (1983), Mork (1989), Hooker (1996), Hamilton (1996) 
and Kilian (2009).  However, monthly GDP at the state level is only available starting in 1997. 
Therefore, the Coincident Economic Activity Index from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia is used instead from July 1979 to November 2010.  According to the bank, the trend 
for each state's index is set to match the trend for gross state product.  For robustness, state-level 
unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are also employed from January 
1976 to April 2011.  To measure the monthly price of oil, I implement the Producer Price Index 
for Petroleum from the BLS.  To ensure the data are stationary, standard transformations are 
used. More specifically, the first difference of the log level of the Coincident Economic Activity 
Index and the Producer Price Index for Petroleum are taken.  Similarly, the first difference of the 
state-level unemployment rate is taken as well. 
The three year NOPI, as discussed above, can be represented as: 
    
      {          {                 }} 
where      is the log level of the Producer Price Index for Petroleum in period t.  Since recent 
activity in oil markets has been relatively volatile compared to pre-OPEC, the NOPI might better 
capture price shocks to oil markets.  
Lastly, various state-level statistics regarding industry shares of GDP are obtained from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and yearly export figures are obtained from the 
International Trade Administration (ITA) from 1999 to 2010. 
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 Methods 
To begin, the following VAR model is estimated for the full sample via OLS: 
         ∑          ∑                 
  
   
  
   
         
         ∑          ∑                 
  
   
  
   
         
where      denotes the percentage change in the Coincident Economic Activity Index for state   at 
time  ,      denotes the percentage change in the Producer Price Index for Petroleum, and    is 
the lag length selected for state  .  For identification, I impose the assumption that      cannot 
contemporaneously affect     .  To examine the relationship between changes in oil prices and 
state-level unemployment, the following VAR model is estimated via OLS:  
   
         ∑          ∑                 
  
   
  
   
         
         ∑          ∑                 
  
   
  
   
         
where      denotes the percentage point change in the unemployment rate for state   at time  .   
As above, I impose the assumption that      cannot contemporaneously affect     .   
To examine how states respond to oil price shocks, cumulative one-year impulse 
response functions (IRF) are calculated for each state, both for the Coincident Economic Activity 
Index and the state-level unemployment rate, in response to a one-standard deviation shock to 
the price of oil.  95% confidence bands are constructed using the wild bootstrap with 1,000 
replications.  I am then able to interpret the sign and magnitude of the response for each state, 
which allows for better understanding of the transmission of oil price shocks to economic 
activity.  All of the previous equations are then re-estimated for the period July 1979 to 
December 1985 and January 1986 to November 2010 for the Coincident Economic Activity 
Index, and January 1976 to December 1985 and January 1986 to April 2011 for the 
unemployment rate to test for asymmetric responses to changes in the price of oil.  In addition, 
all of the above equations, tests, and sub samples are re-estimated using the NOPI. 
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In order to understand the transmission of oil price shocks to economic activity and 
unemployment rates, impulse responses at 6 and 12 months for the full sample are regressed on 
various state-level statistics regarding industry shares.  The estimation equation for the 
Coincident Economic Activity Index is: 
      
                                                           
where       
  is the impulse response   steps ahead to a standard oil price shock in state  , 
         is the average percentage of the Leisure & Hospitality industry as a share of GDP 
from 1976 to 2009 in state  ,               is the average percentage of the manufacturing 
industry as a share of GDP from 1976 to 2009 in state  ,     is the average percentage of the oil 
and natural gas extraction industry as a share of GDP from 1976 to 2009 in state  , and     is the 
average percentage of the farming industry as a share of GDP from 1976 to 2009. Similarly, the 
estimation equation for state-level unemployment is: 
      
                                                           
where       
  is the impulse response   steps ahead to a standard oil price shock in state   and the 
other variables are the same as listed above.  Equations (5) and (6) are then re-estimated using 
the impulse responses to a one-standard deviation NOPI shock. 
Lastly, because of the large number of U.S. states, it is sometimes difficult to analyze the 
results. Therefore, the states are categorized by the largest industry as a share of GDP averaged 
over the full sample period.  These classifications are only meant to simplify the interpretation of 
the impulse response functions by broadly grouping states by industry.  The four industries 
considered are manufacturing, tourism, oil and natural gas extraction, and agriculture.  The 
service sector is the dominant industry in the U.S., and uses little energy, so classifying all states 
as service sector would not be informative.  It should be noted that in most states, the largest 
industry outside of the service sector is manufacturing, but states were only categorized as such 
if they exceeded the average manufacturing share of GDP for all 50 states.  Therefore, if a state 
had below average manufacturing share of GDP, it is classified by its next largest industry share.  
For example, Florida's manufacturing share of GDP is below the national average, so it is 
classified as a tourism state because that is its next largest industry as a share of GDP.  The 
classification for all 50 states can be seen in Table 1.1.  States that appear in multiple industries 
without an asterisk do not have one dominant industry outside of manufacturing, such as 
California and Utah.   
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Table 1.1  Top Non-Service Industry by Share of State-Level GDP 
Industry State 
Manufacturing AL, AR*, CT, DE, GA, IL, IN, IA*, KS*, KY, 
ME, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, NH, NC, OH, 
OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, VT*, WA, WI  
Tourism AZ, CA, FL, HI, MD, MT, NV, NJ, NY, UT, 
VA, VT*, WV 
Oil & Natural Gas AK, CO, LA, KS*, ND*, NM, OK, TX, UT, 
WV**, WY 
Agriculture AR*, CA, IA*, ID, KS*, MT, NE, ND*, SD, 
UT 
* These states have above average GDP share in more than one industry, so they are listed in 
multiple categories. For example, Iowa has above average manufacturing share and agriculture 
share, so it is difficult to place it in one category. 
** Technically, WV is not a top oil and natural gas producing state, but it does depend heavily 
on coal production, so it seems to make more sense grouping it with other energy producing 
states. 
 
 Results 
When states experience a typical oil price shock, how do their economies respond?  Is the 
response in each state positive or negative, and what is the magnitude of response?  Answering 
these questions should help explain the transmission of oil price shocks through the economy and 
provide support for existing theories.  Therefore, cumulative one-year IRFs are plotted as well as 
their respective upper and lower 95 percent confidence bands for both the coincident economic 
activity index and the unemployment rate.  For the coincident economic activity index (Y) 
between 1979 and 2010, energy producing or refining states have positive responses and 
manufacturing and tourism states have negative responses to oil price shocks.  However, the 
responses are not significantly different from zero.  Using the relative size of each state's 
economy as a share of the total U.S. economy, a weighted effect on U.S. economic activity in 
response to an oil price shock between 1979 and 2010 is -0.01 percent.  For the state-level 
unemployment rate (U) between 1976 and 2011, energy states experience a decrease in 
unemployment and manufacturing states experience an increase in unemployment one-year after 
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an oil price shock, but the results are again insignificant.  The weighted effect on the U.S. 
unemployment rate is a -0.01 percentage point change.  
 NOPI 
In the OPEC period, fluctuations in the price of oil have been much more volatile than 
prior to the creation of OPEC.  Consequently, Hamilton (1996) advocates the use of the NOPI 
when analyzing the oil price-macroeconomy relationship since the economy will respond 
differently to historically large price increases, than increases following price decreases.  If this 
is true, then one should expect to see larger changes in economic activity and unemployment 
following a shock to the NOPI.  The one-year cumulative impulse response to a standard 
deviation NOPI shock for the coincident economic activity index (Y) between 1979 and 2010 
can be seen in Figure 1.1.  Specifically, the dot for each state is the cumulative one-year impulse 
response and the line through each dot is the 95 percent confidence band.  In addition, the 
percent change in economic activity is listed on the x-axis.  For example, a value of -0.01 
represents a one percent decrease in economic activity.  Nearly all states see economic activity 
decline and by a larger magnitude for NOPI shocks compared to regular oil price shocks.  
Furthermore, out of the 15 most negative responses, all but two of them, Montana and Virginia, 
have above average manufacturing shares and are classified as such.  The 15 most negative 
changes in economic activity range from -0.257 percent in Montana to -0.796 percent in 
Michigan.  Looking at Figure 1.1, Michigan's negative response nearly doubles that of most 
other states.  Michigan has long been known for manufacturing, most notably automobiles with 
the big three: GM, Ford and Chrysler.  With Michigan's economy depending so heavily on 
durable goods such as automobiles, its large negative response in economic activity following a 
NOPI shock supports the findings of Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), Lee and Ni (2002), and 
Edelstein and Kilian (2009).  The only states to experience no change or an increase in economic 
activity following a NOPI shock are some of the top energy producing states Wyoming, 
Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, and Alaska.  Specifically, only Wyoming and Oklahoma 
experience increases in economic activity, and in fact Wyoming and Oklahoma have the highest 
percentage of  
10 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Economic Activity Impulse Response to NOPI Shock 1979-2010 
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workers employed in the oil and natural gas extraction industry with 3.7 and 4.2, and the second 
and sixth highest share of GDP attributed to oil and natural gas extraction, respectively. Clearly 
their positive response in economic activity of 0.269 and 0.186 percent respectively is not 
unexpected. 
 The top five tourism states (Nevada, Hawaii, Vermont, Florida and Montana) all have 
responses that are in the 20 most negative, ranging from -0.23 to roughly -0.30 percent change in 
economic activity one year after a NOPI shock.  These findings suggest that large increases in 
the price of oil may cause leisure travel to become too expensive for individuals and families and 
thus states that rely heavily on tourism suffer as a result of the higher oil prices.  It is obvious 
that tourism and manufacturing states experience the largest declines in economic activity 
following a NOPI shock, but which states are relatively unaffected by these historically large 
increases to the price of oil?  According to Figure 1.1, it appears that many agricultural states 
such as North Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, California and South Dakota, have very small negative 
responses in economic activity one year following a NOPI shock.  According to the USDA 
economic research service in 2004, North Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, California and South Dakota 
ranked 20, 2, 7, 1, and 16 in agricultural output respectively.  These results indicate that 
agricultural may be an industry that is more resilient to oil price shocks.  It is widely known that 
during a recession or economic downturn, consumer spending on non-durable goods is much 
more stable than spending on durable goods.  Therefore, spending on food is unlikely to change 
much after an oil price shock.  In addition, if commodity prices move together, then an increase 
in oil prices might also coincide with an increase in agricultural commodity prices.  As a result, 
many agricultural states may be partially insulated from the negative effects of an oil price 
shock.  Lastly, the 12-month weighted effect on U.S. economic activity following a NOPI shock 
is roughly -0.20 percent change.  Comparing this to the weighted effect from a typical oil price 
shock (-0.01 percent change), it is clear why Hamilton argues for the use of the NOPI when 
analyzing the effects of oil price increases on economic activity. 
 To see if the unemployment rate produces similar patterns, the one-year impulse response 
and 95 percent confidence bands to a standard NOPI shock for the state-level unemployment rate 
(U) between 1976 and 2011 can be seen in Figure 1.2.  The values on the x-axis represent the 
percentage point change in the unemployment rate.  For example, a value of 0.005 represents an 
increase in the unemployment rate of 0.5 percentage points.  In general, the main patterns 
12 
 
remain: manufacturing states experience the largest increase in unemployment rates while energy 
and agricultural states experience little to no increase in unemployment rates.  The states that are 
most adversely affected are again top manufactures like Kentucky, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Michigan, Wisconsin and Mississippi.  
 
 
Figure 1.2  Unemployment Impulse Response to NOPI Shock 1976-2011 
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At an aggregate level, the 12-month weighted effect on the U.S. unemployment rate is a 0.09 
percentage point change. 
 From this analysis, it is clear that not all states are impacted in the same way following 
historically large oil price shocks.  In general, states which rely on the oil and natural gas 
extraction industry experience no change or increases in economic activity following oil price 
shocks.  Tourism states have significant decreases in economic activity, while manufacturing 
states are the most adversely affected by oil price shocks.  These findings are important for the 
understanding of the transmission mechanism of oil price shocks to the macroeconomy, but a 
more rigorous approach is needed to verify the results.       
 Regression Analysis  
Although clear patterns seem to emerge with manufacturing and tourism states being 
adversely affected by NOPI shocks, and energy states benefiting from NOPI shocks, it would be 
helpful to back up these findings via linear regression.  Table 1.2 shows the results from equation 
(5), using the responses from shocks to the NOPI.  The regression results from impulse responses   
Table 1.2  Explaining the Economic Activity Response to NOPI Shock 
     
       
  
   
0.0000 
(0.01) 
-0.0001 
(-2.15) 
Tourism 
-0.0013 
(-1.18) 
-0.0005 
(-0.70) 
Manufacturing 
-0.0013 
(-2.72) 
-0.0003 
(-0.96) 
OG 
0.0012 
(2.21) 
0.0012 
(3.70) 
Ag 
-0.0000 
(-0.03) 
0.0002 
(0.30) 
F-stat 6.52 6.49 
p-value 0.00 0.00 
Adj.    0.31 0.31 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis 
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at 6 and 12 months following one-standard deviation NOPI shocks are found in columns 2 and 3, 
respectively, of Table 1.2.  The coefficients on the variables represent the percentage change in 
impulse responses following a one percent increase in each respective industry share of GDP. 
At an interval of six months, Manufacturing and Oil and Natural Gas extraction (OG) are 
statistically significant and both have the sign I expect.  After a one-standard deviation shock to 
the NOPI, a state with a ten percent higher manufacturing industry as a share of GDP 
experiences a 1.3 percent decrease in economic activity.  This finding is consistent with the IRFs 
in Figure 1.1 that show states like Michigan, South Carolina and Ohio having the largest declines 
in economic activity following a NOPI shock.  Conversely, after a one-standard deviation shock 
to the NOPI, a state with a ten percent higher oil and natural gas extraction industry as a share of 
GDP experiences a 1.2 percent increase in economic activity.  Since movements in the NOPI 
only show relatively large increases in the price of oil, the fact that oil and natural gas production 
is so important is intuitive.  Large shocks to the price of oil will spur economic activity in those 
energy producing states.  Based on the law of supply, when oil prices increase, there is an 
incentive for producers to expand production, which means more economic activity in those 
energy states.  In addition, states are likely to receive higher tax revenue from the expanded oil 
production, which should have positive effects on the state's economy.   
Table 1.3 shows the results from equation (6), using the responses from shocks to the 
NOPI.  The coefficients on the variables in Table 1.3 represent the percentage point change in 
unemployment rate impulse responses following a one percent increase in each respective 
industry share of GDP.  At an interval of six months, Manufacturing is statistically significant 
and has the expected sign.  Specifically, a ten percent increase in the manufacturing industry as a 
share of GDP leads to an increase in the unemployment rate of 0.34 percentage points six months 
following a NOPI shock.  At 12 months, Manufacturing is nearly statistically significant at the 
5% level and has a similar value of 0.23 percentage points.  Based on the findings of Table 1.3, 
after historically large oil price increases the only variable that statistically affects the change in 
the unemployment rate is the relative importance of the manufacturing industry.  These findings 
give substance to the IRFs which show that states with a higher dependence on manufacturing 
have larger increases in unemployment rates following NOPI shocks. 
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Table 1.3  Explaining the Unemployment Response to NOPI Shock 
     
       
  
   
0.0000 
(0.97) 
0.0000 
(0.45) 
Tourism 
0.0005 
(1.47) 
0.0001 
(0.16) 
Manufacturing 
0.0003 
(2.17) 
0.0002* 
(1.75) 
OG 
-0.0002 
(-1.25) 
0.0000 
(0.15) 
Ag 
-0.0002 
(-0.46) 
-0.0002 
(-0.69) 
F-stat 3.56 1.43 
p-value 0.01 0.24 
Adj.    0.17 0.03 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis       * = 10% Significance      
 
 Subsample Analysis  
The late 1970s to mid-1980s primarily experienced increases in the price of oil, with 
large increases in 1979 and 1980 due to supply and oil-specific demand shocks, which can be 
thought of as precautionary demand for oil driven by uncertainty about future oil supply 
shortfalls (Figure 4: Kilian 2009).  Therefore, the period from 1976 to 1985 provides a natural 
setting to examine the effects of an oil price shock caused by supply disruptions and fears of 
future oil shortages.  The price of oil collapsed in early 1986 and has been quite volatile since, 
with many large increases and decreases in price.  According to Figure 4 of Kilian (2009), much 
of the recent increase in oil prices since the early 2000s has been caused by increases in global 
economic activity, so the later period from 1986 to 2011 might provide a natural setting to 
examine the effects of an oil price shock caused by greater global demand for commodities, 
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which indicate a healthy global marketplace.  The percentage change in the price of oil and the 
NOPI are plotted over time in the left and right panel, respectively, of Figure 1.3.   
In addition, the economic reaction to oil price movements between the two periods can be 
compared to test for asymmetric responses to oil price increases versus decreases, since the early 
period essentially only experienced increases in the price of oil while the later period was filled 
with equal amounts of price increases and decreases (see Figure 1.3).  Finally, examining the 
responses to NOPI shocks between the two periods can show if the oil price-macroeconomy 
relationship has changed, and has less of an impact on economic activity and unemployment 
today than 20 to 30 years ago (see Figure 1.3).  It should be noted that oil price shocks were 
slightly larger in magnitude during the later period. Therefore, in order to accurately compare 
results between the periods, the impulse responses for the later period are scaled down by using 
the same magnitude of shock that occurred in the early period.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3  Change in Oil Price (left panel) and NOPI (right panel) from 1976 to 2011 
17 
 
 1976 to 1985 
During a period of rising oil prices caused partly by supply disruptions and partly by 
fears of future oil shortages, how do changes in oil prices impact economic activity?  To answer 
this, one-year impulse responses to a standard oil price shock for the coincident economic 
activity index (Y) between 1979 and 1985 are calculated.  Oil producing states benefited and 
industrial states were adversely affected from the rise in oil prices in the late 1970s to mid-1980s 
and overall changes in economic activity were slightly larger than for the full sample period. 
However, the results are not significantly different from zero.  Since most states had greater 
responses between 1979 and 1985, one would expect the cumulative effect on U.S. economic 
activity to be larger as well, which is evident with a value of -0.19 percent change.  For the state-
level unemployment rate (U) between 1976 and 1985, a similar pattern appears with nearly every 
state experiencing a rise in unemployment one-year after a typical oil price shock, especially 
manufacturing states.  Once again though, the results are insignificant.  At an aggregate level, the 
U.S. unemployment rate experienced a 0.07 percentage point increase one-year after a typical oil 
price shock. 
 1986 to 2011 
After the collapse of oil prices in early 1986 and moving forward to the present day, what 
kind of effect do changes in oil prices have on economic activity?  Does the volatility of the 
recent period change the results compared to the early period?  Additionally, do the higher oil 
prices in the 2000s, caused by stronger global economic activity, mitigate the negative effects on 
the economy?  For the coincident economic activity index (Y) between 1986 and 2010, the 
response to a standard oil price shock is very similar to that of the full sample period, both in 
magnitude and significance.  Specifically, the results show that during the later period energy 
and agricultural states fared well in response to a typical oil price shock, while tourism and some 
manufacturing states did not.  At an aggregate level, a one-standard deviation oil price shock 
increases economic activity by 0.02 percent.  The one-year impulse response to a standard oil 
price shock for the state-level unemployment rate (U) between 1986 and 2011 also exhibits 
similar responses to that of the full sample period.  For U.S. unemployment 12-months after a 
typical oil price shock, the rate decreases by 0.03 percentage points. 
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 NOPI: 1976 to 1985 
The one-year impulse response to a standard NOPI shock for the coincident economic 
activity index (Y) between 1979 and 1985 can be seen in Figure 1.4.  The interpretation of 
Figure 1.4 is similar to that of Figure 1.1, with the percent change in economic activity listed on 
the x-axis.  For example, a value of -0.01 represents a one percent decrease in economic activity.  
During this time of increasing oil prices, only energy states benefited while industrial hotbeds 
such as Indiana, Ohio and Michigan were damaged the most.  The effects of oil price shocks 
during the early period were widespread, with 82 percent of states experiencing a decline in 
economic activity one-year after a NOPI shock.  Consequently, the change in U.S. economic 
activity in response to a NOPI shock is -0.28 percent.  It should be noted that some of the 
confidence bands are not statistically different from zero, but the top and bottom of Figure 1.4 
tell a clear story of energy states benefiting and manufacturing states suffering as a result of 
historically large oil price shocks.   
The one-year impulse response to a typical NOPI shock for the state-level unemployment 
rate (U) between 1976 and 1985 can be seen in Figure 1.5.  The interpretation of Figure 1.5 is 
similar to that of Figure 1.2, with the values on the x-axis representing the percentage point 
change in the unemployment rate.  For example, a value of 0.005 represents an increase in the 
unemployment rate of 0.5 percentage points.  The results in Figure 1.5 are very similar to those 
above, with nearly every state having an adverse reaction to a NOPI shock except for a handful 
of states.  In fact, 88 percent of states have higher unemployment rates one-year after a NOPI 
shock.  As was the case above, some of the confidence bands are not statistically different from 
zero, but it is clear how states reacted to higher oil prices during the early period.  One year 
following a typical NOPI shock, unemployment rises by 0.50 percentage points in Michigan and 
0.37 percentage points in Wisconsin, with many other industrial states having similar responses.  
Similar to the regression analysis in Table 1.3, the oil and natural gas extraction and tourism 
industry are not significant in determining a state’s change in unemployment following a 
typically NOPI shock.  For example, Hawaii experiences no change in unemployment while 
Oklahoma experiences a slight increase.  The weighted effect on the aggregate unemployment 
rate is an increase of 0.11 percentage points.     
It seems evident that the historically large oil price increases during the early period had 
large and wide-spread detrimental effects on state-level economies.  Whether this was because 
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the U.S. economy was more reliant on oil in the production process or because this episode of 
higher oil prices was caused by supply and speculative disruptions cannot be inferred at this 
point but will be answered in the following sections.  
 
Figure 1.4  Economic Activity Impulse Response to NOPI Shock 1979-1985 
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Figure 1.5  Unemployment Impulse Response to NOPI Shock 1976-1985 
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 NOPI: 1986 to 2011 
During the later period 1986 to 2010, how did state-level economic activity respond one-
year after a typical shock to the NOPI?  Figure 1.6, which can be interpreted in the same fashion 
as Figure 1.4, clearly shows that every state except Wyoming, Alaska and Texas experienced a 
decline in economic activity, while Ohio, Oregon, Maine, South Carolina and Michigan had the 
largest declines in economic activity.  However, the magnitude of change is relatively small 
compared to the early period (Figure 1.4).  What explains the smaller response during the later 
period? Evidence from Kilian (2009) suggests that the some of the oil price shocks in the later 
period were caused by a growing global economy, which would have some positive effects for 
the U.S. economy.  Alternatively, it is possible that during the later period changes in economic 
activity were smaller because of a changing U.S. economy, which has shifted away from 
manufacturing and towards the service sector.  The weighted effect of a one-standard deviation 
NOPI shock on U.S. economic activity during the later period is a decrease of 0.18 percent.   
The one-year impulse response to a typical NOPI shock for the state-level unemployment 
rate (U) between 1986 and 2011 can be seen in Figure 1.7, which can be interpreted in the same 
fashion as Figure 1.5.  Although many of the responses are not large in magnitude, nearly all of 
them show a rising unemployment rate, especially manufacturing states like Mississippi and 
Michigan.  However, at the aggregate level, it is apparent that even historically large oil price 
increases from 1986 to 2011 do not have a significant impact on unemployment, with only a 0.08 
percentage point increase.  It is interesting to note that the handful of states in which 
unemployment rates are unchanged, are mostly agricultural or energy dependent; these two 
industries are the key to escaping the detrimental effects of relatively large increases to the price 
of oil.     
 Comparing the Early and Later Periods 
When using the NOPI to examine the effects of oil price shocks, the transmission 
mechanism between the early and later periods are similar.  Specifically, the states that had 
economic activity decline the most or unemployment rates rise the most were generally 
industrial, and the states that were unaffected or benefited generally depend on energy or 
agriculture more than the average state.  One glaring difference between the two periods is the 
magnitude of response, with the early period exhibiting much larger responses in economic 
22 
 
activity and unemployment rates. This implies that either the oil price-macroeconomy 
relationship is gradually becoming less important because of changing industries and technology, 
or that the early period suffered from oil price increases caused by supply and speculative 
disruptions, while the later period's oil price increase can be partly attributed to growing global 
aggregate demand. 
 
 
Figure 1.6  Economic Activity Impulse Response to NOPI Shock 1986-2010 
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Figure 1.7  Unemployment Impulse Response to NOPI Shock 1986-2011 
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 Explaining Smaller Economic Responses to Oil Price Shocks 
There has been an overall decline in the relative importance of manufacturing in the U.S., 
both in employment and GDP shares, starting in the 1950s and accelerating in the 1970s. 
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the manufacturing industry as a share of total 
U.S. GDP has gone from 22.7 percent in 1970 to 11.7 percent in 2010.
1
  According to Davis and 
Haltiwanger (2001), Lee and Ni (2002), Kilian (2007), Edelstein and Kilian (2009), and 
Hamilton (2009), the durable goods industry, especially the automotive industry, is the most 
susceptible to the negative effects of oil price shocks.  Consequently, the decline in 
manufacturing from the early to the later period should help explain why states are not as 
severely affected by oil price shocks as they once were.  Another dramatic change during last 40 
years has been the increase in energy efficiency, whether in production or consumption. 
However, the real question is how much is being spent on energy as a share of GDP, not 
necessarily how much energy is being consumed.  Therefore, the importance of energy 
expenditures for each state, referred to as Energy Intensity (EI), is calculated as total energy 
expenditures as a percentage of state-level GDP between 1976 and 2010.  State-level energy 
expenditures are available from the Energy Information Administration.
2
   
The analysis between the early (1976-1985) and later (1986-2011) periods show that 
there has been a decline in the magnitude of response to a NOPI shock, both for the coincident 
economic activity index (Y) and the unemployment rate (U).  To understand why the oil price-
macroeconomy relationship has weakened, one can analyze how various industry shares of GDP 
and Energy Intensity (EI) have changed over the same period.  Specifically, the following 
equation is estimated for the economic activity index (Y) and the unemployment rate (U): 
                                                               
where       is the change in the cumulative 12-month impulse response to a NOPI shock for 
state   between 1976-1985 and 1986-2011,      is the change in energy intensity for state   
between the two periods,         is the change in the percentage of GDP in the manufacturing 
industry for state   between the two periods,           is the change in the percentage of GDP 
in the tourism industry for state   between the two periods,      is the change in the percentage 
                                                 
1
 http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm 
2
 http://www.eia.gov/state/seds/seds-data-complete.cfm#full2 
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of GDP in the oil and natural gas extraction industry for state   between the two periods, and 
     is the change in the percentage of GDP in the agricultural industry for state   between the 
two periods.   
Table 1.4  Explaining the Change in Response to NOPI Shocks for Economic Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
0.0011 
(0.85) 
-0.0009 
(-1.61) 
-0.0019 
(-4.33) 
-0.0025 
(-5.64) 
-0.0015 
(-2.45) 
0.0003 
(0.13) 
    
-0.0652 
(-2.49) 
    
-0.0251 
(-0.71) 
        
-0.0228 
(-2.45) 
   
-0.0172 
(-1.15) 
           
-0.0176 
(-0.32) 
  
-0.0022 
(-0.04) 
       
0.0255 
(3.13) 
 
0.0080 
(0.51) 
        
-0.0339 
(0.95) 
-0.0438 
(-1.03) 
Adj.    0.10 0.09 -0.02 0.15 0.00 0.12 
 
 First, how is the change in response to NOPI shocks for the economic activity index (Y) 
affected by changes in other variables?  Table 1.4 contains the results from the estimation of 
equation (7), with column 6 containing all independent variables and columns 1-5 containing 
only one independent variable.  The coefficients represent the percent change in the IRF due to a 
typical NOPI shock between the early and later period for a state with a one percent decline in 
the respective industry share of GDP.  Examining the results in Table 1.4, it is evident that 
decreased energy expenditures as a share of state-level GDP has led to smaller economic 
responses to NOPI shocks in the later period, with a coefficient of -0.0652 for    .  To give 
context to this coefficient, consider that the state with the largest decline in energy intensity 
experienced a 0.45 percent smaller decline in economic activity in response to a NOPI shock 
during the later period, while the state with the largest growth in energy intensity experienced a 
0.21 percent larger decline in economic activity.  In column (2), the decline in the manufacturing 
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sector across the U.S. has played a role in the smaller economic response to oil price shocks 
between the early and later periods.  The coefficient on        is -0.0228, indicating that states 
in which the manufacturing industry as a share of GDP declined between the two periods, 
experienced less of a decrease in economic activity one-year following a typical NOPI shock in 
the later period.  The state with the largest decline in manufacturing experienced a 0.41 percent 
smaller decline in economic activity in response to a NOPI shock during the later period, while 
the state with the largest growth in manufacturing experienced a 0.12 percent larger decline in 
economic activity.  Lastly, a general decline in the oil and natural gas extraction industry across 
the U.S. can help explain smaller economic responses to NOPI during the later period.  
Specifically, the coefficient on     is 0.0255, meaning that states which experienced a decline 
in the oil and natural gas extraction industry as a share of GDP between the two periods, 
experienced more of a decrease in economic activity one-year following a typical NOPI shock.  
Another way to explain this is that energy states experienced less of an increase in economic 
activity following oil price shocks.  The state with the largest decline in oil and natural gas 
extraction experienced a 0.47 percent larger decline in economic activity in response to a NOPI 
shock during the later period.   
 Next, how is the change in response to NOPI shocks for the unemployment rate (U) 
affected by changes in other variables?  The results of equation (7), with changes in the 
unemployment rate IRF between the periods as the dependent variable, are reported in Table 1.5, 
and can be interpreted in a similar fashion as Table 1.4.  The results of Table 1.5 reveal the 
declining manufacturing and oil and natural gas extraction industry explain the smaller responses 
to oil shocks during the later period.  However, Energy Intensity (EI) is insignificant in 
explaining the changing relationship.  First, the coefficient on        is now positive with a 
value of 0.0063, but this is expected since Table 1.5 is dealing with changes in the 
unemployment rate.  Again, to give some economic meaning to the results, the state with the 
largest decline in manufacturing as a share of GDP experienced a 0.11 percentage point smaller 
rise in unemployment in response to a NOPI shock during the later period, while the state with 
the highest growth in manufacturing experienced a 0.03 percentage point larger increase in 
unemployment.  Second, the coefficient on     is -0.0075, which indicates that states with a 
declining oil and natural gas extraction industry experienced more of an increase in the 
unemployment rate in the later period.  Specifically, the state with the most significant decline in  
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Table 1.5  Explaining the Change in Response to NOPI Shocks for Unemployment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
0.0001 
(0.18) 
0.0003 
(1.56) 
0.0006 
(4.36) 
0.0007 
(4.95) 
0.0006 
(2.88) 
0.0003 
(0.43) 
    
0.0127 
(1.37) 
    
-0.0028 
(0.24) 
        
0.0063 
(2.15) 
   
0.0070 
(1.39) 
           
0.0186 
(1.13) 
  
0.0206 
(1.18) 
       
-0.0075 
(2.21) 
 
-0.0020 
(-0.34) 
        
0.0011 
(0.11) 
0.0110 
(0.86) 
Adj.    0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.05 
 
oil and natural gas extraction experienced a 0.12 percentage point larger rise in unemployment in 
response to a NOPI shock during the later period.  
The oil price-macroeconomy relationship has weakened during the last 40 years, which 
can be explained by the changing composition of the U.S. economy, namely the declining 
manufacturing and energy industry that has led to the U.S. economy being more resistant to oil 
price fluctuations.  Interestingly, the United States is currently going through an energy boom in 
oil and natural gas extraction, which means future oil price shocks could lead to larger increases 
in economic activity for these energy states.  Similarly, many manufacturing jobs are being 
brought back to the U.S. as cost advantages vanish in other countries and firms have access to 
cheap U.S. energy.  Therefore, if there is a significant increase in the manufacturing industry as a 
share of GDP, the U.S. may experience magnitudes of response to large oil price shocks similar 
to the late 1970s and early 1980s.  However, increased energy efficiency helps explain smaller 
responses to historically large oil price shocks during the later period when examining the 
economic activity index, so this may limit future responses to ever being as large as they were 
during the early period.  
28 
 
 The Effects of Global Aggregate Demand Oil Shocks from 2002-2007 
According to Kilian (2009), the rise in oil prices from 2002 to 2007 can be almost 
entirely explained by an increase in global economic activity, which is why he argued that there 
was no recession or economic downturn from 2002 to 2007.  In addition, if high oil prices from 
2002 to 2007 were caused by a strong global economy, then this might help explain the smaller 
economic responses that states experienced in the later period.  To see if Kilian's theory holds 
true, the response in the coincident economic activity index and the unemployment rate are 
analyzed following oil price shocks from January 2002 to December 2007, particularly focusing 
on the leading exporting states (see Table 1.6).  
Specifically, the following regressions are run to isolate the effects of NOPI shocks on 
economic activity and unemployment from January 2002 to December 2007: 
                                                    
                                                    
where       denotes the percentage change in the Coincident Economic Activity Index for 
state   at time  ,      denotes the percentage point change in the unemployment rate for state   at 
time  ,         denotes the NOPI shocks at time   lagged          months, and      is a 
dummy variable with values of 1 from January 2002 to December 2007 and zero otherwise.  The 
NOPI coefficients from equations (8) and (9) are summed to obtain the one-year effect on 
economic activity and unemployment, respectively, following a one-standard deviation NOPI 
shock for the full sample period.  The coefficient from the 2002 dummy is then added to reveal 
the effects of a NOPI shock during the 2002 to 2007 period.    
For the economic activity index, there is little evidence of smaller responses to NOPI 
shocks from 2002 to 2007.  Specifically, the average response across all 50 states for the full 
sample period and the 2002 - 2007 period is -0.2922 and -0.2919 percent change, respectively.    
The average response for the top ten exporting states for the full sample period and the 2002 - 
2007 period is -0.3257 and -0.3260 percent change, respectively.  During a period of rising oil 
prices caused by a growing global economy, the top exporting states actually experienced a 
larger decrease in economic activity.  Compare this to the bottom ten exporting states, which 
experienced an average change for the full sample period and the 2002 - 2007 period of -0.1923 
and -0.1898 percent, respectively.  Unexpectedly, for the states which do not rely on the sale of 
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goods and services to the global market, aggregate demand oil price shocks produced less 
negative economic responses.   
Table 1.6 Top Ten Exporting States as a Percentage of GDP 
State Exports/GDP 
Vermont 16.6% 
Washington 14.7% 
Texas 13.8% 
Louisiana 13.7% 
Michigan 10.2% 
Kentucky 10.2% 
South Carolina 9.5% 
Oregon 9.3% 
Alaska 8.9% 
Indiana 8.5% 
 
For the unemployment rate, there is also limited evidence of smaller responses to NOPI 
shocks from 2002 to 2007, both for exporting and non-exporting states.  The average response 
across all 50 states for the full sample period and the 2002 - 2007 period is 0.1024 and 0.1017 
percentage points, respectively.  The average response for the top exporting states declined from 
0.1285 to 0.1276 percentage points, and the average response for the bottom exporting states 
declined from 0.0793 to 0.0785 percentage points.  
The magnitude of difference between the full sample period and the 2002-2007 period is 
very small and does not provide compelling evidence to explain the decline in the oil price-
macroeconomy relationship post 1985.  Therefore, to be certain that I am measuring true 
aggregate demand oil price shocks caused by a growing global economy, Kilian's (2009) 
endogenous aggregate demand oil shocks are constructed by using his methods discussed in 
Section II, pages 1058-1060.  The index of real economic activity is available on Kilian's 
webpage
3
, and global crude oil production is available from the U.S. Energy Information 
                                                 
3
 http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/reaupdate.txt 
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Administration.  To be consistent with the rest of this chapter, the Producer Price Index for 
Petroleum is used as the measure of oil prices. 
The following regression is run to isolate the effects of aggregate demand oil shocks on 
economic activity and unemployment from January 2002 to December 2007: 
                                                 
                                                 
where       denotes the percentage change in the Coincident Economic Activity Index for state   
at time  ,      denotes the percentage point change in the unemployment rate for state   at time  , 
      denotes the aggregate demand oil shocks at time   lagged          months, and      
is a dummy variable with values of 1 from January 2002 to December 2007 and zero otherwise.  
The results of equations (10) and (11) can be interpreted in the same fashion as equations (8) and 
(9), except the changes in economic activity and unemployment are in responses to a one-
standard deviation aggregate demand oil price shock.    
 One year following an aggregate demand oil price shock, the average response across all 
50 states for the full sample period and 2002 - 2007 period is 0.045 and -0.0812 percent change, 
respectively.  These results are the opposite of what one would expect if the 2002 - 2007 period 
was a time of high oil prices caused by strong global economic growth.  Furthermore, the top 
exporting states experienced an average response during the full period and 2002 - 2007 period 
of 0.0758 and -0.229 percent change, respectively.  However, the bottom exporting states 
benefited from aggregate demand oil price shocks from 2002 - 2007.  Specifically, the bottom 
ten exporting states experienced an average response during the full period and 2002 - 2007 
period of 0.113 and 0.2895 percent change, respectively.  
 For the unemployment rate, there is some evidence of more beneficial responses to a 
typical aggregate demand oil price shock from 2002 to 2007, both for exporting and non-
exporting states.  The average response across all 50 states for the full sample period and the 
2002 - 2007 period is -0.0112 and -0.0704 percentage points, respectively.  In addition, the top 
ten exporting states experienced an average response during the full period and 2002 - 2007 
period of -0.019 and -0.076 percentage points, respectively.  Similarly, the bottom ten exporting 
states experienced an average response during the full period and 2002 - 2007 period of -0.016 
and -0.10 percentage points, respectively.  These results suggest that aggregate demand oil price 
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shocks from 2002 - 2007 led to more beneficial outcomes for the average state, but it was the 
non-exporting states that benefited the most. 
 Overall, there is very limited evidence of global aggregate demand oil price shocks 
leading to beneficial outcomes, especially for the top exporting states.  The results are stronger 
for the unemployment rate, both for NOPI and aggregate demand oil price shocks.  Certainly, 
there is not compelling enough evidence that global aggregate demand oil price fluctuations from 
2002 - 2007 can help explain smaller economic responses during the later period 1986 - 2011.  
Rather it was the declining manufacturing and oil and natural gas extraction industry, as well as 
an increase in energy efficiency, which led to smaller economic responses to oil price shocks 
during the later period.   
 Asymmetric Responses 
When one compares the results of regular oil price shocks, which include both increases 
and decreases in price, with NOPI shocks, there is some evidence of asymmetric responses.  
However, the NOPI is a censored measure of oil price shocks, so a better way to test for the 
presence of asymmetry is to construct a net oil price decrease (NOPD) index.  If the economy 
responds similarly to large decreases in the price of oil as it does to large increases, then the 
NOPD and NOPI should produce mirror results.  The NOPD was constructed with the same 
techniques used for the NOPI, except I looked for the largest decreases in the price of oil. The 
three year NOPD can be represented as:      
    
      {     {                }      } 
Since there were hardly any major decreases in the price of oil prior to 1986, the asymmetric 
analysis is only carried out for the later period, 1986 to 2011.   
 Economic Activity Index 
Comparing the one-year impulse response in the economic activity index (Y) for the 
NOPI and the NOPD between 1986 and 2010 reveals that there is strong evidence of asymmetric 
responses, seen in Figure 1.8.  The top panel shows impulse responses to NOPI shocks and the 
bottom panel shows impulse responses to NOPD shocks.  In response to a NOPI shock, nearly all 
of the states have a negative response, and if there is evidence of symmetry, then nearly all of the 
states should have a positive response to a NOPD shock.  However, the bottom panel clearly 
shows otherwise, with about half of the states experiencing an increase and about half 
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experiencing a decrease in economic activity.  In addition to a different pattern of response, the 
magnitude of change is different as well.  For example, Michigan's economic activity decreased 
by 0.51 percent in response to a typical NOPI shock, but increased by only 0.02 percent in 
response to a typical NOPD shock.  Additionally, an energy state like Wyoming experienced an 
increase in economic activity of roughly 0.13 percent in response to a typical NOPI shock, but 
experienced a decrease in economic activity of roughly 0.44 percent in response to a typical 
NOPD shock.     
 Unemployment  
Do changes in the unemployment rate show evidence of asymmetry?  Examining the one-
year impulse response in the state-level unemployment rate (U) for NOPI and NOPD shocks 
between 1986 and 2011, reveals that consumers and businesses respond differently to oil price 
increases and decreases.  The top panel of Figure 1.9 shows impulse responses to NOPI shocks 
and the bottom panel shows impulse responses to NOPD shocks.  It is obvious that nearly every 
state experienced higher unemployment rates in response to a NOPI shock, whereas not every 
state experienced lower unemployment rates in response to a NOPD shock.  Furthermore, the 
magnitude of change is much smaller for the NOPD shock, with many states having no 
substantial increase or decrease in the unemployment rate.   
After investigating both economic activity and unemployment rates, economic analysis 
involving energy prices and macro variables should not assume symmetric responses to price 
changes.  Although energy price decreases may provide a boost in some regions of the country, 
these changes are not comparable to the negative effects felt by a vast majority of states 
following energy price increases.  Future research should be clear on the meaning of price shock, 
as the response to increases and decreases are not the same.   
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Figure 1.8  Comparing NOPI and NOPD Responses for Economic Activity 
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Figure 1.9  Comparing NOPI and NOPD Responses for Unemployment 
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 Conclusion  
Studying the oil price-macroeconomy relationship at the U.S. state-level allows for better 
understanding of how and why oil price shocks affect the economy.  Specifically, I find 
detrimental effects for manufacturing states following a NOPI shock, while energy producing 
states benefit or are unaffected.  As a robustness check, impulse responses are regressed on 
various state-level industry statistics, and the results indicate that higher industry shares of 
manufacturing and oil and natural gas extraction significantly affect the responses. 
When the analysis is split into an early (1976-1985) and a later (1986-2011) period using 
the NOPI, the magnitude of change is much smaller in the later period when compared to the 
early period.  Two possible explanations for these smaller responses are America's increased 
energy efficiency and the declining manufacturing industry.  Regression analysis reveals that the 
state with the largest decline in the manufacturing industry between the early and later period 
had a 0.30 percent smaller decrease in economic activity and a 0.17 percentage point smaller 
increase in the unemployment rate as a result of a NOPI shock, while the state with the largest 
decline in energy intensity between the early and later period experienced a 0.45 percent smaller 
decrease in economic activity as a result of a NOPI shock.  I find very limited evidence that 
global aggregate demand oil price fluctuations from 2002 - 2007 can help explain smaller 
economic responses during the later period 1986 - 2011.  The reason the change in economic 
activity is smaller in response to oil price shocks between the two periods is not because of 
different types of oil prices shocks, but because of a fundamental shift in the U.S. economy. 
I find evidence supporting asymmetric responses, both for economic activity and the 
unemployment rate, by comparing impulse responses to NOPI and NOPD shocks. In most cases, 
the pattern of response and the magnitude of change are quite different. Therefore, future studies 
analyzing the effects of oil price shocks, both positive and negative, should construct separate 
NOPI and NOPD series to truly understand how the economy responds.   
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Chapter 2 - Energy Price Shocks and Economic Activity: Which 
Energy Price Series Should We Be Using? 
 Introduction 
A considerable amount of literature has been devoted to understanding the effects of 
energy price shocks on economic activity.  Energy price shocks are typically modeled as shocks 
to the price of oil and the effects of the shocks are frequently examined at the aggregate level.  
However, the United States is a very diverse country with very diverse economies in each state.  
For example, Nebraska’s economy is much more dependent on agriculture than Massachusetts, 
which means each state might respond to various energy price shocks in its own way.  In 
addition, energy price shocks other than oil may have varying effects on production or 
consumption decisions.  Electricity and diesel price shocks may affect firms’ production costs, 
but a shock to the price of gasoline is more likely to impact consumers on the demand side.  
Furthermore, weather differs significantly across the country, so it is possible that heating oil 
price shocks more directly impact states in the northeast than they do states in the southwest.  In 
examining carbon emissions and urban development, Glaeser and Kahn (2010) find a negative 
correlation between the average January temperature and natural gas and heating oil 
consumption, and a positive correlation between average July temperature and electricity 
consumption.  Therefore, conducting a study at the U.S. state-level that captures the effects of 
alternative energy price shocks on economic activity provides insight on how these price shocks 
affect the economy.  Exploiting the considerable cross-sectional variation in state-level data 
allows us to better understand the transmission of energy price shocks to the macroeconomy.  In 
this chapter, I estimate the magnitude and determine the sign of economic response to various 
forms of energy price shocks in each state, as well as how they differ by industry, climate, and 
other factors.   
If alternative energy price shocks impact states differently, we should expect models with 
multiple energy prices to forecast economic activity better than models with only oil prices.  This 
has implications for state-level forecasters who want to know how tax revenue, GDP, or 
unemployment will be affected by energy price shocks.  Although many forms of energy such as 
gasoline and heating oil are derived from oil, and thus their prices are correlated, there are still 
large movements in alternative energy price series that are independent of movements in the oil 
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market.  For example, Kilian (2007) notes that Hurricanes Rita and Katrina in 2005 resulted in 
higher gasoline prices because of damaged refineries, but not higher oil prices.  This suggests 
that from a consumer's point of view, gasoline prices may be more relevant than oil prices.  
Figure 2.1 plots the percentage change in the monthly energy price series of oil, gasoline, diesel, 
natural gas, heating oil and electricity. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2.1 Percentage Change in Energy Series 
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Although the gasoline and diesel series are similar to oil, it is clear some movements are 
independent of others.  For example, the price of oil increased nearly 40 percent during the Gulf 
War, but gasoline prices only increased by about 10 percent.  In addition, the natural gas and 
electricity series are very different than the oil-based series.  In fact, Bachmeier and Griffin 
(2006) find that crude oil, coal and natural gas markets are only very weakly integrated, 
indicating that there is not one primary energy market.   
Energy and movements in its price can affect the economy through many different 
channels.  In 2009 the average U.S. consumer spent $6,110, or about 12.5 percent of total 
expenditures, on energy related items such as utilities, gasoline, motor oil, and public 
transportation.
4
  With such a large portion of expenditures relating to energy, energy price shocks 
have a major impact on the typical U.S. family.  It should also be noted that increases in energy 
or fuel prices tend to find their way into food prices, which accounted for about 13 percent of 
total expenditures in 2009.  Since energy consumption is important for the average U.S. 
consumer, large and unexpected increases in energy prices could force consumers to make 
decisions on where to spend their income.  As energy prices rise, consumers will reduce their 
consumption of energy; for instance, walking more and driving less, but empirical studies have 
found this to be limited.  The majority of the population will still need to drive to work, heat their 
homes in the winter, and cool their homes in the summer.  According to Hughes, Knittel, and 
Sperling (2008) the short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand from 2001 to 2006 ranged from 
-0.034 to -0.077, which means that in practice higher gasoline price increases cause energy to 
consume larger portions of family budgets.  Consequently, large energy price shocks will force 
consumers to cut back on other purchases, possibly leading to a recession.  The Labor and capital 
in the automobile industry will not be able to instantaneously move to other sectors of the 
economy, which will intensify the effects of an energy price shock (Hamilton 2008).  Industries 
that are very energy intensive will also be negatively impacted by energy price shocks.  
Conversely, states that are producers of energy might benefit from a shock to energy prices and 
consequently see production and employment expand.   
 
                                                 
4
 U.S. Dept. of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditures in 2009, Report 1029 
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 Literature Review 
It is my understanding that I am the first to study the macroeconomic effects of 
alternative energy price shocks to gasoline, diesel, natural gas, heating oil and electricity at the 
U.S. state-level.  As a result, the literature surrounding these topics is limited.  Currently, the 
literature focuses primarily on the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks, but as it has 
already been noted, alternative energy series such as gasoline or natural gas do not always follow 
movements in the oil market, and vice versa.  Kilian (2007) points out that oil is not the main 
source of energy consumed by either consumers or producers.  Specifically, he notes that as of 
2002, gasoline accounts for 48.7 percent of all energy used by consumers, compared with 12.3 
percent for natural gas and 33.8 for electricity. For producers, electricity makes up 40.3 percent 
of energy usage, natural gas 14.5 percent, unleaded gasoline 14 percent, diesel fuel 11.4 percent 
and jet fuel 9.7 percent.  Consequently, he notes that using these alternative energy price series in 
macroeconomic models may be more appropriate in certain situations.   
A recent development in the literature is examining the role of high gas prices in 
explaining the financial crisis of 2007-08.  Joe Cortright (2008) finds that in some major U.S. 
cities such as Chicago and Los Angeles, home prices in 2007 were likely to rise for zip codes 
closest to the city business district and fall for zip codes farther away from the city business 
district.  In a working paper, Sexton, Wu and Zilberman (2012) take these findings a step further 
and formulate a theoretical model explaining how high gas prices in 2007-08 burst the housing 
bubble.  Essentially, gas prices from 1986 to the early 2000s were below $2 per gallon in real 
2001 dollars, which made suburban housing that requires long commute times affordable.  Home 
ownership reached record levels in each year from 1994 to 2006, which was also the peak of 
subprime mortgages.  Therefore, home ownership became an option for a new class of lower 
income individuals.  When gas prices hit $4.15 per gallon in 2008, this caused suburban living to 
become unaffordable for some, causing foreclosure rates to rise and home values to fall.  This is 
another example of how alternative energy prices, such as gasoline or diesel, may have more of a 
direct effect on the economy than oil prices.  By studying the effects of alternative energy price 
shocks, this study adds to the energy price-macroeconomy literature. 
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 Data 
The Coincident Economic Activity Index from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
from July 1979 to June 2011 is used to measure economic activity at the state-level.  According 
to the bank, the trend for each state's index is set to match the trend for each state's gross state 
product.  For robustness, state-level unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) are also employed from January 1976 to June 2011. 
Six different measures of energy prices are collected from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) Short-Term Energy Outlook from September 2011.  The energy series end 
in June 2011 and include: imported crude oil prices (January 1976), motor gasoline retail prices 
(January 1976), on-highway diesel prices (January 1979), residential natural gas prices (January 
1981), heating oil prices (November 1978) and residential electricity prices (July 1976).  All of 
the energy series are deflated by the U.S. CPI for all urban consumers to create real energy price 
series.  To ensure the data are stationary, standard transformations are used.  More specifically, 
the first difference of the log level of the Coincident Economic Activity Index, oil price, gasoline 
price, diesel price and heating oil price are taken.  Natural gas and electricity prices exhibited 
seasonality, so the seasonal difference of 12 months is applied to the log level of each series. 
Lastly, the first difference of the state-level unemployment rate is taken as well.  
To help interpret the results, states are classified by their dominant industry.  Annual 
industry shares of GDP are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from 
1976 to 2010. 
 Methods 
To analyze the energy price-macroeconomy relationship, the following VAR model is 
estimated via OLS: 
         ∑          ∑                      
  
   
  
   
         
              ∑          ∑                           
  
   
  
   
         
where      denotes the percentage change in Economic Activity for state   at time  ,           
denotes the percentage change in the price of energy series   at time  , and    is the lag length 
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selected in state  .  For identification, I impose the assumption that           cannot 
contemporaneously affect     .  To examine the relationship between changes in energy prices 
and state-level unemployment, the following VAR model is estimated via OLS: 
         ∑          ∑                      
  
   
  
   
         
              ∑          ∑                           
  
   
  
   
         
where      denotes the percentage point change in the unemployment rate for state   at time  .  As 
above, I impose the assumption that           cannot contemporaneously affect     .   
To examine how states respond to alternative energy price shocks, cumulative one-year 
impulse response functions (IRF) are calculated for each state, both for the Coincident Economic 
Activity Index and the state-level unemployment rate, in response to a two-standard deviation 
shock to the price of energy series z.  In a working paper by Melichar (2013), one-standard 
deviation oil price shocks do not have statistically significant effects on economic activity, so 
two-standard deviation price shocks are used in this study.  In addition, 95% confidence bands 
are constructed using the wild bootstrap with 1,000 replications. I am then able to interpret the 
sign and magnitude of the response for each state, which allows for better understanding of the 
transmission of energy price shocks to economic activity.  
In order to decide which energy series help forecast economic activity best, both pseudo 
out-of-sample and in-sample tests are employed.  Specifically, the Diebold-Mariano (DM) test 
compares the baseline model 1 with oil against models 2 through 6 with alternative energy series.  
All the models come from the VAR framework using equations (1) - (4).  Forecasts are estimated 
recursively with a 75 percent hold-back sample.  In other words, 75 percent of the data are used 
to estimate the VAR model, with the remaining 25 percent used for forecasting.  The loss 
differential series for 3, 6 and 12 month-ahead forecasts can be represented by:    
                 
where       is the squared forecast error in state   at time   for model 1, and       is the squared 
forecast error in state   at time   for model 2.  The null hypothesis of equal predictive power is 
tested by regressing      on a constant, and using a t-test with HAC standard errors to determine 
if the mean of   is different from zero.   
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 To test in-sample fit, the Davidson and MacKinnon J-test is employed.  Similar to the 
DM test, the baseline model 1 is compared against models 2 through 6 using equations (1) - (4).  
The fitted values from the alternative energy price model are then included among the set of 
regressors for the baseline model to see if they improve fit and vice versa.   
 Results 
To interpret the results from all 50 U.S. states, each state is classified according to the 
largest industry as a share of GDP in the full sample period.  The four industries considered are 
manufacturing, tourism, oil and natural gas extraction, and agriculture.  The service sector is the 
dominant industry in the U.S. and uses little energy, so classifying all states as service sector 
would not be informative.  The classification of states can be viewed in Table 1.1.   
 Economic Activity Impulse Responses 
Examining the impulse responses from energy price shocks allows for understanding of 
how and why they affect the macroeconomy.  Additionally, the impulse responses from oil price 
shocks can be compared to those from alternative energy price shocks to see how they differ. 
Understanding which forms of energy matter the most for individual areas of the country 
improves our understanding of the energy price-macroeconomy relationship.  Therefore, 
cumulative one-year impulse responses to energy price shocks are plotted, as well as their 
respective upper and lower 95 percent confidence bands.  For all Figures 2.2 - 2.6, the percent 
change in economic activity is listed on the x-axis, meaning a value of -0.01 represents a one 
percent decrease in economic activity.   
The one-year impulse response to a two-standard deviation oil price shock for the 
coincident economic activity index (Y) can be seen in Figure 2.2.  There are three distinct groups 
of states in their response; ones that benefit, ones that do not experience much change, and ones 
that are hurt.  For the most part, the states that benefit from oil price shocks are energy states like 
Wyoming, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Alaska, Kansas, Louisiana and Colorado.  The states that 
have a negative response in economic activity to an oil price shock are mostly manufacturing 
states, with the exception of a few tourism states.  All of the 15 most negative responses are 
either manufacturing states like Michigan, or tourism states like Nevada. It should be noted that 
many of the 95 percent confidence bands are not significantly different from zero, but the pattern 
of response is still clear.     
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Figure 2.2  Economic Activity Impulse Response to Oil Price Shock 
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Figure 2.3  Economic Activity Impulse Response to Gasoline Price Shock 
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Next, Figure 2.3 shows the one-year impulse response to a two-standard deviation 
gasoline price shock for the coincident economic activity index (Y).  The overall trends are the 
same when compared to Figure 2.2, but the top tourism states of Florida, Hawaii and Nevada 
have more negative responses.  Therefore, based on the results of Figure 2.3 and the fact that 
higher gasoline prices have a more direct impact on consumer income than oil prices, using 
gasoline prices in macroeconomic models may be a better approach for tourism states.  The 
effects of a diesel price shock are very similar to that of the gasoline price shocks shown in 
Figure 2.3, so they are omitted to conserve space.   
Do higher natural gas prices have a different effect on economic activity than higher oil 
prices?  It is evident from Figure 2.4, which shows the one-year impulse response to a two-
standard deviation natural gas price shock, that the top energy states benefit less, especially 
Wyoming and Oklahoma.  Furthermore, there is some evidence of rust-belt states being more 
negatively affected compared to oil price shocks, such as Michigan, Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Wisconsin and Illinois.  Not only is natural gas important in the production process for these 
states, it is also important for consumers who use it to heat their homes in the winter.  Therefore, 
since natural gas accounts for about 14.5 and 12.3 percent of energy usage by producers and 
consumers, respectively, this might help explain this region’s negative response.  
The effects of a two-standard deviation heating oil price shock price on economic activity 
are seen in Figure 2.5.  The pattern of response is similar to an oil price shock, but New England 
states such as Massachusetts experience a larger decrease in economic activity.  New England is 
a primary consumer of heating oil, so it is expected that these states are more adversely affected 
than others.  Also, excluding Wyoming, the top energy states benefit less from a heating oil price 
shock compared to an oil price shock.   
Lastly, Kilian (2007) notes that about 40 percent of energy usage by producers can be 
attributed to electricity.  Figure 2.6 shows the one-year impulse response functions following a 
two-standard deviation electricity price shock for the coincident economic activity index (Y).  
One glaring difference between Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.6 is that higher electricity prices do not 
increase economic activity for U.S. states, except for Alaska.  Furthermore, many Midwest states 
like Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas and South Dakota have some of the most 
negative responses to electricity price shocks, whereas many of these states do not have a much 
of a decline following an electricity price shock, which is expected since electricity prices  
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Figure 2.4  Economic Activity Impulse Response to Natural Gas Price Shock 
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Figure 2.5  Economic Activity Impulse Response to Heating Oil Price Shock 
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Figure 2.6  Economic Activity Impulse Response to Electricity Price Shock 
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do not directly impact the cost of vacations and travel.  Interestingly, West Virginia experiences 
more than a one percent decrease in economic activity one year after a two-standard deviation 
electricity price shock.  West Virginia has been one of the top steel producing states in the 
country, and since steel requires much electricity in production, this might explain its response.  
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania are also negatively impacted by electricity price shocks 
and all depend upon steel or other forms of manufacturing to sustain their economy.   
 Economic Activity Regression Analysis  
A more rigorous approach to determine the effects of alternative energy price shocks on 
economic activity is represented in the equation below:  
                                                             
where           is the cumulative 12 month impulse response to a two standard deviation price 
shock to energy series   in state  ,          is the average percentage of the Leisure & 
Hospitality industry as a share of GDP from 1976 to 2009 in state  ,       is the average 
percentage of the manufacturing industry as a share of GDP from 1976 to 2009 in state  ,     is 
the average percentage of the oil and natural gas extraction industry as a share of GDP from 
1976 to 2009 in state  , and     is the average percentage of the farming industry as a share of 
GDP from 1976 to 2009.  The various permutations of equation (5) for all the energy series are 
available in Tables 2.1 – 2.6, with column (5) containing all of the independent variables.  The 
coefficients on the variables represent the percentage change in cumulative impulse responses to 
a two standard deviation price shock to energy series   following a one percent increase in each 
respective industry share of GDP.  The results from the various permutations of equation (5) 
confirm that the manufacturing and oil and natural gas extraction industry are the most important 
in determining a state’s response to energy price shocks, but there are some instances where high 
industry shares in tourism or agriculture are important for energy shocks other than oil.   
Table 2.1 contains the results of equation (5) for oil price shocks.  Manufacturing and Oil 
and Natural Gas extraction (OG) are both statistically significant and have the expected sign.  
After a two standard deviation shock to the price of oil, a state with a one percent higher 
manufacturing share of GDP experiences a 1.5 percent decrease in economic activity.  
Conversely, increasing the oil and natural gas extraction industry share by one percent increases 
economic activity by 3.2 percent.    
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Table 2.1  Y: IRF Regressions for Oil Price Shocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   0.000 
(0.32) 
0.002 
(2.25) 
-0.001 
(-2.45) 
-0.000 
(-0.87) 
0.001 
(0.63) 
        -0.019 
(-1.18) 
   -0.023 
(-1.53) 
       -0.015 
(-2.59) 
  -0.009 
(-1.40) 
     0.032 
(5.00) 
 0.026 
(3.53) 
      0.014 
(0.80) 
0.009 
(0.58) 
Adj    0.01 0.10 0.33 -0.01 0.35 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis  
   
 The results of the regression analysis for gasoline price shocks can be found in Table 2.2.  
The results are similar to those of Table 2.1, except the share of GDP in the tourism industry is 
significant at the ten percent level.  Specifically, a state with a one percent higher tourism share 
of GDP experiences a 3.4 percent decrease in economic activity one year following a two 
standard deviation gasoline price shock.  This result is consistent with Figure 2.3, which shows 
the top tourism states of Nevada, Hawaii and Florida exhibiting some the largest decreases in 
economic activity in response to gasoline price shocks.  For top tourism states, economic 
forecasters may obtain more accurate results of the effects of energy price shocks on economic 
activity by using gasoline prices instead of oil prices.       
Next, the results from the regression analysis involving diesel price shocks are available 
in Table 2.3.  The results are very similar to that of gasoline price shocks, with higher shares of 
tourism and manufacturing leading to decreases in economic activity, and higher shares of oil 
and natural gas extraction leading to increases in economic activity.  
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Table 2.2  Y: IRF Regressions for Gasoline Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   -0.001 
(-0.38) 
0.001 
(1.20) 
-0.001 
(-3.62) 
-0.001 
(-2.12) 
-0.000 
(-0.38) 
        -0.034* 
(-1.95) 
   -0.031* 
(-1.90) 
       -0.012* 
(-1.88) 
  -0.005 
(-0.71) 
     0.035 
(4.97) 
 0.032 
(4.00) 
      0.028 
(1.51) 
0.024 
(1.54) 
Adj    0.05 0.05 0.33 0.03 0.39 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis               * = 10% Significance 
 
   
Table 2.3  Y: IRF Regressions for Diesel Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   -0.000 
(-0.26) 
0.002 
(1.38) 
-0.002 
(-3.89) 
-0.002 
(-2.12) 
0.000 
(0.21) 
        -0.043 
(-2.12) 
   -0.046 
(-2.44) 
       -0.017 
(-2.17) 
  -0.011 
(-1.32) 
     0.042 
(5.04) 
 0.035 
(3.77) 
      0.029 
(1.31) 
0.021 
(1.13) 
Adj    0.07 0.07 0.33 0.01 0.411 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis  
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Applying equation (5) to natural gas IRFs reveal similar patters to those above, but the 
reasoning behind them is less clear.  Specifically, I am unsure why a state with a higher tourism 
share of GDP would experience a larger decrease in economic activity one year after a natural 
gas price shock.  However, the sign of the coefficient for manufacturing and oil and natural gas 
extraction are expected, since industrial production is dependent upon natural gas and states 
extracting natural gas will benefit from higher prices.  Specifically, one year following a two 
standard deviation natural gas price shock, a state with a one percent higher oil and natural gas 
extraction industry share of GDP experiences a 2.7 percent increase in economic activity.  The 
results from the regression analysis involving natural gas IRFs can be found in Table 2.4.     
 
Table 2.4  Y: IRF Regressions for Natural Gas Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   -0.001 
(-3.35) 
0.000 
(0.24) 
-0.002 
(-7.75) 
-0.002 
(-3.60) 
-0.000 
(-0.07) 
        -0.022* 
(-1.72) 
   -0.029 
(-2.34) 
       -0.011 
(-2.35) 
  -0.009 
(-1.68) 
     0.027 
(5.06) 
 0.021 
(3.43) 
      0.003 
(0.18) 
-0.004 
(-0.33) 
Adj    0.04 0.08 0.33 -0.02 0.37 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis             * = 10% Significance 
 
The results from the regression analysis involving heating oil price shocks can be seen in 
Table 2.5.  The main points remain unchanged, with higher shares of manufacturing and oil and 
natural gas extraction leading to decreases and increases in economic activity one year following 
a large heating oil price shock, respectively. 
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Table 2.5  Y: IRF Regressions for Heating Oil Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   -0.001 
(-2.20) 
0.001 
(0.73) 
-0.003 
(-7.03) 
-0.002 
(-3.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.77) 
        -0.030 
(-1.66) 
   -0.030* 
(-1.88) 
       -0.015 
(-2.30) 
  -0.006 
(-0.97) 
     0.042 
(6.25) 
 0.037 
(4.85) 
      0.016 
(0.80) 
0.011 
(0.74) 
Adj    0.03 0.03 0.44 -0.01 0.46 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis         * = 10% Significance 
 
Table 2.6 contains the results of the regression analysis for electricity price shocks.  A 
very interesting finding appears for states with higher shares of GDP in agriculture, which up to 
this point has been statistically insignificant in all regressions.  However, one year after a two 
standard deviation electricity price shock, states with a one percent higher agriculture industry 
share of GDP experience a 2.5 percent decrease in economic activity.  This finding is significant 
at the ten percent level and is consistent with Figure 2.6, which shows agricultural states like 
Iowa, Kansas, Idaho, Nebraska and South Dakota experiencing some of the largest decreases in 
economic activity following large electricity price shocks.   
When examining the effects that various industry shares of GDP have on states’ 
economic responses to energy price shocks, it is evident that the manufacturing and oil and 
natural gas extraction industry play the most important role in determining a state’s response.  
However, higher shares of GDP in the tourism industry lead to significant decreases in economic 
activity following gasoline and diesel price shocks.  This is an important finding that should be 
noted by state-level economists in tourism states.  Lastly, electricity price shocks have a negative 
affect for states with higher industry shares in agriculture.    
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Table 2.6  Y: IRF Regressions for Electricity Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   -0.003 
(-6.75) 
-0.001 
(-1.01) 
-0.003 
(-8.55) 
-0.002 
(-4.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.53) 
        0.009 
(0.64) 
   -0.002 
(-0.11) 
       -0.010 
(-2.04) 
  -0.008 
(-1.31) 
     0.016 
(2.57) 
 0.011 
(1.53) 
      -0.025* 
(-1.74) 
-0.028 
(-1.96) 
Adj    -0.01 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.14 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis        * = 10% Significance  
 
 Unemployment Rate Impulse Responses 
To see if the unemployment rate produces similar patterns, cumulative one-year impulse 
responses to energy price shocks are plotted, as well as their respective upper and lower 95 
percent confidence bands.  For all Figures 2.7 - 2.9, the percentage point change in the 
unemployment rate is listed on the x-axis, meaning a value of  0.005 represents an increase in the 
unemployment rate of 0.5 percentage points.     
  Figure 2.7 displays the response to an oil price shock, with familiar patterns of energy 
states benefiting and manufacturing states being hindered.  Similar to economic activity, many of 
the 95 percent confidence bands for the unemployment rates are not significantly different from 
zero, but the pattern of response still sheds some light on the energy price-macroeconomy 
relationship.  The responses to a gasoline price shock are very similar to that of Figure 2.7, so 
they are omitted to conserve space.  However, tourism states of Nevada and Florida experience a 
greater increase in unemployment in response to a gasoline price shock.  The impulse responses 
to a diesel price shock are similar to that of Figure 2.7, so they are omitted to conserve space as 
well. 
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One year after a two-standard deviation natural gas price shock, roughly half of states 
experience an increase in unemployment rates while half experience a decrease, which can be 
seen in Figure 2.8.  However, the pattern of response, when grouped by industry, is less clear.  
Nevertheless, some patterns do appear, with certain top natural gas producing states such as 
Louisiana, New Mexico, Alaska and Wyoming, experiencing some of the largest declines in 
unemployment rates.    
 
 
Figure 2.7  Unemployment Impulse Response to Oil Price Shock 
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Figure 2.8  Unemployment Impulse Response to Natural Gas Price Shock 
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Figure 2.9  Unemployment Impulse Response to Electricity Price Shock 
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The way in which state-level unemployment rates respond to a heating oil price shock is 
similar to how they respond to an oil price shock, so they are omitted to conserve space.  
However, decreases are of smaller magnitude and increases are of larger magnitude.  In addition, 
Vermont, Maryland and Delaware, all of which are states in the northeast that use heating oil, 
have much more of a detrimental response to a heating oil price shock than an oil price shock.   
Lastly, electricity price shocks are painful for the entire country, which can be seen in 
Figure 2.9.  As was the case for economic activity, traditional steel and manufacturing states of 
West Virginia, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania again have some of the least favorable 
responses. 
In general, alternative energy price shocks like gasoline and diesel do not produce 
dramatically different economic responses than oil price shocks, except for a few tourism states.  
Energy series that are less closely tied to oil, such as natural gas and electricity, do produce 
different economic responses than oil.  As a result of these different responses, and the fact that 
alternative energy series account for a large portion of energy consumption, it is possible that 
they may also help forecast economic activity or unemployment rates better than oil. 
 Unemployment Rate Regression Analysis  
Tables 2.7 – 2.12 contain the results of the various permutations of equation (5) when 
applied to the unemployment rate and reveal the only industries that are significant in explaining 
a state’s response to energy price shocks are manufacturing and oil and natural gas extraction.  
Table 2.7 shows the results for the regression analysis for oil price shocks, with a one percent 
increase in manufacturing share of GDP leading to a 0.3 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate one year following a two standard deviation oil price shock.  Conversely, a 
one percent increase in the oil and natural gas extraction industry causes a 0.40 percentage point 
decrease in the unemployment rate.   
Next, Tables 2.8 and 2.9 contain the results of equation (5) for gasoline and diesel price 
shocks, respectively.  Again, manufacturing and oil and natural gas extraction have the expected 
sign, but tourism is not significant.  Although the tourism industry was important in determining 
the response in economic activity, the same cannot be said for the unemployment rate.  
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Table 2.7  U: IRF Regressions for Oil Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   -0.000 
(-1.26) 
-0.001 
(-2.24) 
-0.000 
(-0.76) 
-0.000 
(-0.42) 
-0.000 
(-0.84) 
        -0.000 
(0.02) 
   0.002 
(0.29) 
       0.003* 
(1.79) 
  0.002 
(1.00) 
     -0.004* 
(-1.72) 
 -0.003 
(-0.96) 
      -0.004 
(-0.87) 
-0.003 
(-0.64) 
Adj    -0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.005 0.02 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis        * = 10% Significance 
   
 
Table 2.8  U: IRF Regressions for Gasoline Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   0.000 
(0.37) 
-0.000 
(-1.37) 
0.000 
(2.09) 
0.000 
(1.34) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
        0.003 
(0.61) 
   0.003 
(0.58) 
       0.003* 
(1.82) 
  0.002 
(0.67) 
     -0.007 
(-3.09) 
 -0.006 
(-2.26) 
       -0.006 
(-1.02) 
 -0.005 
(-0.90) 
Adj    -0.01 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.13 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis       * = 10% Significance 
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Table 2.9  U: IRF Regressions for Diesel Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   0.000 
(0.88) 
-0.001 
(-1.85) 
0.000 
(1.58) 
0.000 
(1.11) 
-0.000 
(-0.16) 
        -0.003 
(-0.53) 
   -0.002 
(-0.24) 
       0.005 
(2.28) 
  0.003 
(0.98) 
     -0.006 
(-2.26) 
 -0.005 
(-1.48) 
      -0.005 
(-0.86) 
-0.005 
(-0.75) 
Adj    -0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.07 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis  
 
   
Table 2.10  U: IRF Regressions for Natural Gas Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   0.000 
(0.26) 
-0.001 
(-2.25) 
0.000 
(1.19) 
0.000 
(0.50) 
-0.000 
(-0.46) 
        -0.002 
(-0.34) 
   -0.000 
(-0.01) 
       0.005 
(2.45) 
  0.003 
(1.11) 
     -0.007 
(-2.80) 
 -0.005* 
(-1.83) 
      -0.003 
(-0.61) 
-0.003 
(-0.48) 
Adj    -0.02 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.11 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis        * = 10% Significance 
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Table 2.11  U: IRF Regressions for Heating Oil Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   0.001 
(3.21) 
-0.000 
(-0.79) 
0.001 
(5.07) 
0.001 
(3.75) 
0.001 
(1.21) 
        -0.001 
(-0.24) 
   -0.002 
(-0.35) 
       0.005 
(2.39) 
  0.001 
(0.59) 
     -0.008 
(-3.27) 
 -0.007 
(-2.60) 
      -0.009 
(-1.56) 
-0.009 
(-1.66) 
Adj    -0.02 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.19 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis  
 
 
Table 2.12  U: IRF Regressions for Electricity Price Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   0.001 
(11.55) 
0.001 
(3.84) 
0.001 
(13.38) 
0.002 
(10.42) 
0.001 
(2.36) 
        0.000 
(0.10) 
   0.002 
(0.44) 
       0.002 
(1.48) 
  0.002 
(1.06) 
     -0.002 
(-0.98) 
 -0.001 
(-0.30) 
       -0.004 
(-0.99) 
-0.003 
(-0.67) 
Adj    -0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis  
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Table 2.10 and 2.11 show the results of the regression analysis for natural gas and heating 
oil price shocks, respectively.  In both cases, the results are similar to those of oil, gasoline and 
diesel price shocks.  
 Finally, when equation (5) is applied for impulse responses to electricity price shocks, 
which can be seen in Table 2.12, none of the industries are statistically significant in determining 
a state’s change in the unemployment rate.   
 In general, it is apparent from the regression analysis that states with higher industry 
shares in manufacturing and oil and natural gas extraction will experience increases and 
decreases in unemployment rates, respectively, following energy price shocks from all series 
except electricity.     
 
 Aggregate Level Impulse Responses 
Although certain states or groups of states respond in distinct ways to various energy 
price shocks, these patterns may not filter through at an aggregate level.  For example, Wyoming 
may have a large increase in economic activity following oil or diesel price shocks, but 
Wyoming’s share of the U.S. economy is very small.  Therefore, one-year impulse responses and 
95 percent confidence bands are constructed at an aggregate level for each of the six energy 
series considered.  It should be noted that Figure 2.10 shows the U.S. aggregate economic 
activity impulse response and not U.S. GDP, and has the percent change in economic activity on 
the x-axis.  Interestingly, oil price shocks appear to have a negligible effect on U.S. economic 
activity, whereas gasoline price shocks have a statistically significant negative effect on 
economic activity.  Specifically, one year following a two standard deviation gasoline price 
shock, U.S. economic activity decreases by 0.23 percent.  Therefore, using alternative energy 
series such as gasoline or diesel may improve the modeling of the energy price-macroeconomy 
relationship.  Also, electricity price shocks have a negative effect on the U.S. economy, which is 
expected based on the results of Figure 2.6, which showed a decline in economic activity for 
nearly every state.   
Next, Figure 2.11 contains the U.S. unemployment rate one-year impulse responses for 
each of the six energy series, and has the percentage point change in the unemployment rate on 
the x-axis.  Higher electricity prices lead to higher unemployment rates, but higher oil, gasoline 
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and diesel prices lead to lower unemployment rates at an aggregate level.  This finding of higher 
gasoline and diesel prices having a beneficial effect for the U.S. unemployment rate is curious, 
since the opposite is true for U.S. economic activity.  It should be noted however, that the 
magnitude of change is small for all of the energy series.  For example, the U.S. unemployment 
rate decreases by roughly 0.1 percentage points one-year after a two standard deviation gasoline 
price shock.   
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Figure 2.10  U.S. Economic Activity Impulse Response to Energy Price Shocks 
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Figure 2.11  U.S. Unemployment Rate Impulse Response to Energy Price Shocks 
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 Forecasting 
 DM Test 
 
Can alternative energy series be used to improve forecasts of macroeconomic variables, 
either in the short or long run?  The results from the DM test between oil and gasoline for the 
economic activity index at forecast horizons of 3, 6 and 12 months can be seen in Table 2.13.  If 
a state is listed in the column for model 1, then the null hypothesis of equal forecast ability 
between the models is rejected, and model 1 provides forecasts with a smaller mean squared 
error.  The opposite interpretation can be given to a state listed in the column for model 2 
through 6, which are the alternative energy series models.  In addition, a state with an asterisk 
rejects the null hypothesis at the ten percent level, as opposed to the traditional five percent level.  
The results from Table 2.13 indicate some evidence of model 1 producing better forecasts for 
energy states at longer forecast horizons.  Also, there is some evidence of model 2 being 
preferred for a handful of manufacturing and tourism states.  
 
Table 2.13  DM Test (Y) - Oil vs Gasoline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.14 contains the results of the DM test for economic activity between oil and 
diesel.  For a vast majority of states, there is no difference between model 1 and 3.  It does 
appear, however, that tourism states of California, Florida and Montana produce better forecasts 
of economic activity with diesel, but Arizona does better with oil.     
 
 
 
 
 1 2 
h = 3  GA, OH*, SD MA* 
h = 6 NE*, OK CA, MA* 
h = 12 AK, OK* DE* 
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Table 2.14  DM Test (Y) - Oil vs Diesel 
 
 
 
 
 
Next, Table 2.15 contains the results of the DM test for economic activity between oil 
and natural gas.  There is no evidence of model 4, which is the alternative model with natural 
gas, producing better forecasts.  Conversely, numerous energy states and a few agricultural states 
have better forecasts with model 1.  Even though the IRFs exhibited a different pattern for 
natural gas price shocks, there is no evidence of this alternative energy series leading to 
improved out-of-sample forecasts.  Table 2.16 contains the results of the DM test for economic 
activity between oil and heating oil and there is not a significant difference between the two.  
One state, Utah, consistently has more accurate forecasts when using model 5 however.   
 
Table 2.15  DM Test (Y) - Oil vs Natural Gas 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.16  DM Test (Y) - Oil vs Heating Oil 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the DM test between oil and electricity can be found in Table 2.17. 
Interestingly, there is no evidence of electricity producing better forecasts even though they 
account for almost half of energy usage by producers.  Energy states improve fit with model 1 at 
 1 3 
h = 3  AZ CA*, FL* 
h = 6 SD - 
h = 12 NE AR, MT 
 1 4 
h = 3  OK, WY - 
h = 6 AK*, OK*, WY - 
h = 12 AK, KS*, ME, MN, NE, SD, WY - 
 1 5 
h = 3  WV ME*, TN, UT, WI 
h = 6 - AL, UT 
h = 12 CO* UT 
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all horizons, and agricultural and manufacturing states improve fit with model 1 at a long 
forecast horizon. 
 Table 2.17  DM Test (Y) - Oil vs Electricity 
 
 
 
 
  
In general, there is not a great amount of difference between the baseline model and 
models 2 and 3 in terms of forecasting ability.  Model 5 leads to better forecasts for only a 
handful of states, but the pattern of response is unclear.  Lastly, for models 4 and 6, there is no 
evidence of better forecasts compared to the baseline model.  When applying the DM test to 
unemployment rates, many of the same patterns appear.  Therefore, the tables are omitted to 
conserve space, but they are available in Appendix A.     
 J Test 
The J-test reveals whether alternative energy series lead to better in-sample fit.  If a state 
is listed in the column for model 1, then the fitted values from the alternative model do not 
improve fit, and it can be concluded that model 1 produces the best fitting model.  The opposite 
interpretation can be given to a state listed in the column for models 2 through 6, which are the 
alternative energy series models.  In addition, it is possible that a better fit can be obtained by 
using a larger model with both oil and the alternative energy series.  In this scenario, a state is 
listed in the column 'Both'.  Lastly, a state with an asterisk is significant at the ten percent level, 
as opposed to the traditional five percent level.   
First, the results from the J-test between oil and gasoline for the economic activity index 
at forecast horizons of 3, 6 and 12 months can be seen in Table 2.18.  At a forecast horizon of 3 
months, there is some evidence of model 2 or both models providing a better fit for energy states 
Oklahoma, West Virginia, Wyoming, Alaska and Texas.  In general, the states that prefer model 
1 at a forecast horizon of 3 months are either manufacturing or tourism states.  As we transition 
to longer forecast horizons of 6 and 12 months, the usefulness of model 2 fades for energy states 
and many of them improve fit with model 1.  
 
 1 6 
h = 3  AK, MD*, NV, OK, WV, WY - 
h = 6 AK, OK, WV, WY - 
h = 12 AK, IA*, KS, LA, ME, MN, MS*, NE*, OH, PA, VT*, WV, WY - 
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Table 2.18  J Test (Y) - Oil vs Gasoline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When model 3 is compared to model 1 in Table 2.19, it is immediately clear that diesel 
improves fit for many states, especially those with tourism as their dominant industry.  This 
finding is especially true at a forecast horizon of 6 months, with Arizona, California, Florida, 
Hawaii, Utah and Vermont improving fit with model 3.  In addition, many manufacturing states 
improve fit with model 3 and short-to-mid forecast horizons.  There is limited evidence of model 
1 improving fit, except for a handful of energy states.  This finding of diesel producing better 
fitting models for manufacturing states, and especially tourism states, is an important finding for 
state-level forecasters.      
 
Table 2.19  J Test (Y) - Oil vs Diesel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.20 shows the results of the J-test between models 1 and 4.  There is substantial 
evidence of model 4 improving fit, particularly at short-to-mid forecast horizons, for 
manufacturing and tourism states.  However, the top two energy states of Oklahoma and 
 1 2 Both 
h = 3 
AR*, AZ, HI, KY, MD, MI, 
ND, OH, OR, SC* 
OK*, WV, WY AK, TX 
h = 6 
AK, ID*, MD, MS*, NE*, 
OR, SC, WA, WY 
NH, TN OK, TX 
h = 12 FL, IA*, MD, OR*, WY MN - 
 1 3 Both 
h = 3 
AK*, ID*, ND, 
WA* 
CA, DE*, IN*, LA*, MT, NH, OH*, 
OR, RI, TN, WV, WY 
AR 
h = 6 MN, OK*, WA 
AZ, CA, FL*, GA*, HI, ID, IN, ME*, 
NH, OH* , SC, SD*, UT, VT*, WI 
WY 
h = 12 
AR*, ID*, 
MD*, WA, WY 
CA*, FL*, HI - 
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Wyoming improve fit with model 1 at these forecast horizons.  It is clear at longer forecast 
horizons that the usefulness of model 4 diminishes and oil should be used in the energy price-
macroeconomic models.   
 
Table 2.20  J Test (Y) - Oil vs Natural Gas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does heating oil, which is important for many cold-weather states in New England, 
produce better forecasts of economic activity than oil?  It is evident from Table 2.21 that model 5 
improves fit for numerous states, many of which are located in New England such as 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  In addition, other 
manufacturing and tourism states that are not located in New England, improve fit with model 5 
as well.  In fact, there are only a handful of states, most of whose dominant industry is energy, 
which improve fit with model 1.  In the future, heating oil should be considered in energy price-
macroeconomic models, except for selected energy states.   
Finally, Table 2.22 shows the results of the J-test between models 1 and 6.  As has been 
the case for many of the model comparisons, energy states of Alaska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
West Virginia and Wyoming improve fit with the baseline model containing oil prices.  
Conversely, there is some evidence of manufacturing states producing better fitting models with 
 1 4 Both 
h = 3 
AR, IA*, MD, OK*, 
VT, WY 
AL*, CA, ID*, IN*, 
KY, MI*, MN*, NV*, 
OH, PA, TN, TX*, UT, 
WA, WI 
AK, AZ, HI, ME, 
ND, NE, SC 
h = 6 
AK, MD, ME, OK, 
WY 
CA, HI, IN, KY, MN, 
NE*, OH*, PA, SD*, 
TN 
SC 
h = 12 
AR*, AZ, HI*, IA*, 
KY*, MA*, MD, 
MN, MO*, RI, SC 
NV* - 
71 
 
the alternative  energy series of electricity or both oil and electricity, but only at short forecast 
horizons.   
Table 2.21  J Test (Y) - Oil vs Heating Oil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings of the J-test for economic activity indicate that energy states typically 
improve fit with the baseline model, but it is possible that model 2 or 3 improve fit at short-to-
mid forecast horizons.  In many instances, numerous manufacturing and tourism states have the 
best fit with alternative energy series, especially at shorter forecast horizons.  Specifically, there 
is ample evidence of model 3 improving fit for tourism states, and model 5 improving fit for 
manufacturing and some states in New England.   
Table 2.22  J Test (Y) - Oil vs Electricity 
 1 5 Both 
h = 3 
AK, ID, ND, 
NE*, NY*, WY 
AL, AR, CA, CT, HI, IN, KY*, MA, MI, 
NH, NM*, NV*, OH, OR, SC, TN, VT 
IA, WA 
h = 6 
AK*,  MD, OK, 
WY 
AL, AR, CA, GA, IN*, KY, MA, ME*, 
MI, NH*, NV, OH*, OR, RI*, SC, SD, 
TN, VT*, WA 
HI 
h = 12 
AK*, ID, MD, 
OK*, WY 
AR, CA, FL*, GA, HI, IA*, IL, MA*, 
ME*, MO*, NE, PA*, RI, SD*, TN*, VT*, 
WA, WI* 
- 
 1 6 Both 
h = 3 
AK, AZ, ME*, ND, 
OK*, OR, SC, WV*, 
WY 
GA*, IL, IN*, KS, MI*, MN, 
NE, PA, WI* 
AR, HI, IA, ID, KY, 
MD, OH 
h = 6 
AK, GA, HI*, ID, KY, 
MD, OH, OK, OR*, 
TN, WY 
AR*, IA*, IL*, MN, NE - 
h = 12 
AK, AR, FL, IA*, KY*, 
MA*, MD, NY, SC, 
WY* 
MN*, MS* ID 
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When applying the J-test to unemployment rates, the broad pattern of alternative models 
improving fit compared to the baseline model remains unchanged.  The one alternative model 
that does not provide much benefit, either for economic activity or unemployment rates, is model 
2.  The results of the J-test for unemployment between oil and gasoline are found in Table 2.23 
and show no meaningful difference between the models.   
  As was the case for economic activity, there is evidence of model 3 improving fit for 
numerous states, which can be seen in Table 2.24.  At a forecast horizon of 3 months, model 3 is 
best for selected manufacturing states and even a top energy state of Wyoming.  At a forecast 
horizon of 6 months, tourism states of Florida and Hawaii prefer model 3 as well.  However, at 
longer forecast horizons there is no significant difference between the models.   
 
Table 2.23  J-Test (U) - Oil vs Gasoline 
  
Table 2.24  J-Test (U) - Oil vs Diesel 
 
The results of the J-test between models 1 and 4 for the unemployment rate are found in 
Table 2.25.  Model 1 improves fit for only a few states, many of which whose dominant industry 
is energy.  The model including natural gas improves fit for many manufacturing states, which is 
an important input in the production process.  As noted by Kilian (2007), natural gas accounts for 
14.5 percent of energy used by producers.  Another possible explanation for the states that prefer 
model 4 is that many of them have relatively cold winters and use more natural gas as a result.      
 1 2 Both 
h = 3 MT*, ND, NV*, RI*, WY* FL, MN*, TX*, UT*, WV - 
h = 6 - - - 
h = 12 KY, OR*, TN, WV* - DE 
 1 3 Both 
h = 3 ID, OK IN*, MI, OH*, OR, SC, VA*, VT, WY - 
h = 6 CO*, OK FL, HI, MA*, MN, TN, WY - 
h = 12 MN*, OR* NH* AL 
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Table 2.25  J-Test (U) - Oil vs Natural Gas 
 
Table 2.26  J-Test (U) - Oil vs Heating Oil 
 
 
Table 2.26 contains the results of the J-test between the baseline model and model 5, 
which includes heating oil.  The findings are very similar to that of Table 2.25, with more states 
improving fit with the alternative energy series.  The last J-test comparison is between model 1 
and model 6, which can be found in Table 2.27.  Interestingly, at a forecast horizon of 3 and 6 
months, either model 6 or both models improve fit for energy states of Alaska, Oklahoma, North 
Dakota and Wyoming.  At these short-to-mid forecast horizons, there is very limited evidence of  
the baseline model providing the best fit.  However, at longer forecast horizons the usefulness of 
model 6 declines.      
All of the alternative models, except model 2, outperform the baseline model containing 
oil, especially at short-to-mid forecast horizons.  These findings are consistent with those of the 
J-test for economic activity, and should be considered moving forward in the energy price-
macroeconomy literature.   
    
 
 1 4 Both 
h = 3 IL, RI, WY 
AL*, IN, MA*, MD*, ME*, MT*, 
NH, PA, SC, TN*, VA*, VT 
AZ 
h = 6 WY AZ, IN, MA*, MI*, NH, PA, SD* - 
h = 12 CO*, MN, OR, WV* ND, NH, OH*, PA* - 
 1 5 Both 
h = 3 CO*, NE, RI*, WV, WY* 
CA*, IN*, MD, MN*, NC*, ND, 
OR*, SC, VT 
OK 
h = 6 OK, UT, WV* FL, MD*, SC, SD*, TN, WI MN 
h = 12 MN*, OR AZ, FL, MA, NH, NY, RI*, VT* NC 
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Table 2.27  J Test (U) - Oil vs Electricity 
 
 Conclusion 
Individuals and businesses consume many different forms of energy, such as gasoline, 
natural gas and electricity.  However, the energy price-macroeconomy literature widely uses the 
price of crude oil to model energy price shocks, even though Bachmeier and Griffin (2006) find 
that oil and alternative energy markets are only very weakly integrated.  Therefore, I explore 
whether alternative energy price shocks impact the economy differently and produce better 
forecasts of economic activity than oil price shocks.   
I discover that alternative energy series produce different patterns of impulse responses 
than the oil price series.  Specifically, gasoline and diesel price shocks have more of a negative 
impact on tourism states than oil price shocks.  Fewer states benefit from natural gas price 
shocks and industrial, Midwest states are hurt more compared to oil price shocks.  States in New 
England, which are the preeminent users of heating oil, have a more negative response to heating 
oil price shocks.  All of the energy price shocks produce both positive and negative responses 
across the U.S., except for electricity price shocks, which produce negative responses for nearly 
every state.  Furthermore, numerous agricultural states are more negatively impacted by 
electricity price shocks compared to oil price shocks.  Also, traditional steel and manufacturing 
states have a more detrimental response to electricity price shocks than oil price shocks, which is 
expected since electricity is an important input in the production process.  
The results of the pseudo out-of-sample DM test reveal that in most scenarios, there is no 
significant difference between oil and the alternative energy series when forecasting economic 
activity.  However, a handful of energy states produce better forecasts with the baseline model 
 1 6 Both 
h = 3 FL, OR, RI, WV 
AK*, GA*, HI, IA, ID*, IL*, MA*, 
MS, MT, NE, OH, OK, PA, SC 
ND, WY 
h = 6 - 
AR*, FL, GA*, IA, MS*, MT, ND*, 
OK 
WY 
h = 12 
IN*, KY*, MN, OH, OR, 
WV 
LA, MT*, NH, OK* - 
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containing oil, while some tourism states produce better forecasts with the alternative models 
containing either gasoline or diesel.   
The results of the in-sample J-test reveal that energy states typically improve fit with the 
baseline model, but it is possible that model 2 or 3 improve fit at short-to-mid forecast horizons.  
In many instances, numerous manufacturing and tourism states have the best fit with alternative 
energy series.  Specifically, there is ample evidence of model 3 improving fit for tourism states, 
and model 5 improving fit for manufacturing states and some states in New England.  The 
overwhelming evidence of the J-test indicates that alternative energy price models, excluding 
model 2, exceed the baseline model for many states, particularly at short-to-mid forecast 
horizons.  However, the results clash with those from the DM test, which indicate limited 
evidence of alternative energy price series producing superior forecasts.  Therefore, it is possible 
that alternative energy price series improve fit in-sample, but do not lead to better fit out-of-
sample.  Lastly, the results when using unemployment rates are similar, but the patterns are 
weaker.  
This paper is the first to explore the effects of alternative energy price shocks on 
economic activity and whether they yield better forecasts of economic activity.  My results 
showcase the importance of examining these alternative series, which produce different patterns 
of response following price shocks, and lead to improved fit for numerous states when compared 
to the baseline model containing oil.  There is not one primary energy market and the price of oil 
is not a good proxy for many of the alternative energy prices.  Therefore, implementing models 
with alternative energy prices should lead to a more accurate modeling of the energy price-
macroeconomy relationship.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
Chapter 3 - How Important is Oil Price Endogeneity? 
  Introduction 
A very large literature has estimated the effect of oil price shocks on economic activity.
5
  
Until recently, it was common to treat oil price movements as if they were exogenous, in the 
sense that they were not driven by changes in the macroeconomy.  Kilian (2009) cast doubt on 
the reasonableness of the assumption of exogenous oil price movements.  He estimated a 
structural VAR model with shocks to the supply of oil, world economic activity, and the 
precautionary demand for oil,
6
 and found that the response of the economy to a higher oil price is 
heavily dependent on the underlying reason for the change.  A shock to world economic activity 
causes the price of oil and US GDP to rise.  In contrast, a shock to the precautionary demand for 
oil causes the price of oil to rise but GDP to fall.  In his words (page 1061), a thought experiment 
asking what happens to the macroeconomy after an unanticipated movement in the price of oil is 
“not well defined”.  
This essay attempts to quantify the importance of modeling the price of oil as an 
endogenous variable when the goal is to predict output.  Little work has been done to show the 
implications in practical forecasting exercises of modeling oil price endogeneity.  There are two 
reasons that explicitly modeling feedback from output to the price of oil may not lead to better 
forecasts of output, in spite of the impulse response functions reported in Kilian (2009).  First, 
while a model with endogenous oil prices is more realistic, modeling feedback from output to the 
price of oil comes at the cost of having to estimate more parameters.  Second, the mere presence 
of oil price endogeneity is not sufficient to justify the use of such a model for predicting output. 
If most oil price movements represent only a single structural shock, or if the relative variances 
of the different shocks that affect the price of oil are constant over the sample, a model with 
endogenous oil prices will offer no advantages over a model with exogenous oil prices.
7
   
This essay uses state-level data on economic activity to compare the performance of 
models with feedback from output to the price of oil against models that treat the price of oil as 
                                                 
5
 See Hamilton (2009) for a literature review. 
6
 Precautionary oil demand shocks arise from the uncertainty about shortfalls of expected supply relative to expected 
demand. 
7
 A related discussion is found in Kilian (2009, page 1068). 
77 
 
exogenous.  There is much variation across the fifty US states in terms of industrial mix, reliance 
on exporting industries, and comovement with the world economy.  By evaluating the predictive 
power of models with endogenous oil prices for all fifty states, we can gain a better 
understanding of the transmission of oil shocks to the economy.  There may be patterns in the 
results that help us to understand when it is important to model oil price endogeneity, and when 
it is not. 
We also do the analysis on different subsamples. The large fluctuations in oil prices in 
some time periods, such as 1979-1980, 1985-1986, and 1990-1991, are widely believed to be due 
to events that directly affected the oil market.
8
  In other time periods, such as 2004-2009, it is 
believed that oil price changes were driven to a large extent by the world economy.  A priori, 
there is no reason to expect models with endogenous oil prices to provide better predictions if 
most oil price fluctuations are due to oil market shocks.   
 
 Data and Models 
 Data 
State-level economic activity is measured by using both the Coincident Economic 
Activity Index from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia from July 1979 to October 2011, 
and unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from January 1976 to 
October 2011.  According to the Federal Reserve Bank, the trend for each state's index is set to 
match the trend for gross state product.  To ensure the data are stationary, standard 
transformations are used.  More specifically, the first difference of the log level of the Coincident 
Economic Activity Index and the first difference of the state-level unemployment rate are taken. 
Consistent with Kilian (2009) measure of the price of oil, we use the Refiner Acquisition Cost of 
Crude Oil (RAC) from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) deflated by U.S. CPI from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from January 1974 to December 2011 in log levels. 
                                                 
8
 Kilian (2009) finds large "precautionary oil demand" shocks in these time periods, but that distinction is not 
important for the purposes of this paper, because we are evaluating the predictive power of endogenous oil price 
movements. 
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We also implement a three year Net Oil Price Increase (NOPI) index based off of the 
work of Hamilton (1996).  Specifically, the three year NOPI from January 1977 to December 
2011 can be represented as: 
    
      {          {                 }} 
where      is the log level of the deflated RAC series in period t. 
 In order to capture the exogenous and endogenous oil price shocks, we use the Real 
Economic Activity (REA) index from January 1976 to Decemeber 2011, which is available on 
Lutz Kilian's webpage
9
, and world crude oil production data from January 1973 to October 2011 
from the EIA.  The first difference of the log level of the world crude oil production data is taken 
to ensure stationarity. 
 Models 
The baseline forecasting model takes the form: 
       ∑        
 
   
 ∑        
 
   
                
where      is economic activity in state   at time  , as measured by either the Coincident 
Economic Activity Index or the unemployment rate,      is the percentage change in     from 
time     to time  , and   is the lag length chosen by the Akaike information criteria (AIC).  
Equation (1) can be viewed as an equation from a bivariate VAR model of the macroeconomy 
and the price of oil.  We use equation (1) as the baseline because all of the regressors are known 
at time  , and the price of oil is observed without a lag, making it suitable for real-time 
forecasting.    
 Although some authors have used linear VAR models, many other authors, building on 
the work of Hamilton (1996), have substituted the net oil price increase (NOPI) for     .  We 
consider a variation of equation (1) where the percentage change in the price of oil is replaced by 
NOPI: 
       ∑        
 
   
 ∑         
 
   
                     
                                                 
9
 http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/ 
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where        is constructed as described above.  The model with      as a regressor allows for a 
nonlinear response of output to oil shocks, but still treat the price of oil as predetermined.  In 
order for us to conclude that explicitly modeling oil price endogeneity leads to better forecasts, 
we require that a model with endogenous oil prices fit better than each of equation (1) – (2).   
 We now turn to the models with endogenous oil prices.  The first model decomposes the 
change in the price of oil into a component that is due to fluctuations in economic activity and a 
component that is due to other shocks.
10
  To remove the endogenous component of oil prices, we 
run the regressions: 
       ∑        
 
   
 ∑         
 
   
     
where REA is Kilian's index of real economic activity at time  .  From these regressions, the 
exogenous oil shock is the residual,    , which enters the model as: 
 
       ∑        
 
   
 ∑  
 
   
   ̂                       
 It is important to emphasize that there is no a priori reason to believe that forecasts of 
output in any particular state will benefit from removing the endogenous oil price component. 
Oil prices have been shown to respond to changes in world output, which implies that oil price 
endogeneity is not an issue for forecasts of state economies that are weakly correlated with world 
output.   
 The second model follows Kilian (2009) in allowing for three shocks, an aggregate 
demand shock that affects the demand for oil, and two oil market shocks, one to the supply of 
oil, and one to the precautionary demand for oil.  We estimate the reduced form VAR model: 
         ∑         
 
   
 ∑        
 
   
 ∑        
 
   
     
                                                 
10
 Kilian (2009) allows for both “oil supply shocks” and “precautionary demand shocks”. What we call the “oil 
market shock” here includes both of Kilian's shocks. Both the oil supply shock and the precautionary demand shock 
should have similar implications for state-level output, as both represent an increase in the price of oil that is not a 
response to output. We consider the two shocks separately below. 
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        ∑         
 
   
 ∑        
 
   
 ∑        
 
   
     
        ∑         
 
   
 ∑        
 
   
 ∑        
 
   
     
 
where      is the percentage change in world crude oil production.  Using a recursive ordering 
for identification, following Kilian (2009), we compute the three shocks. The oil supply shock, 
  
          
, is equal to the residual of the equation for      .  The aggregate demand shock, 
  
               
, is the residual from a regression of     on    .  The oil specific demand 
shock,   
         , is the residual from a regression of     on     and    .   
 The three identified shocks are then used as predictors:   
       ∑        
 
   
 ∑    
          
 
   
                    
       ∑        
 
   
 ∑    
               
 
   
                    
       ∑        
 
   
 ∑    
         
 
   
                    
 The final model in our comparison is:  
       ∑        
 
   
 ∑    
          
 
   
 ∑    
               
 
   
 
 ∑    
          
 
   
                    
which is a larger model containing all of the endogenous oil price shocks.  All models and 
whether they account for endogeneity are represented in Table 3.1.   
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Table 3.1  List of Models 
Model Estimation Equation 
Endogeneity 
(Yes/No) 
M1        ∑         
 
   
 ∑         
 
   
 No 
M2        ∑         
 
   
 ∑          
 
   
 No 
M3        ∑         
 
   
 ∑   
 
   
   ̂         Yes 
M4        ∑         
 
   
 ∑     
          
 
   
       Yes 
M5        ∑         
 
   
 ∑     
                
 
   
       Yes 
M6        ∑         
 
   
 ∑     
          
 
   
       Yes 
M7        ∑         
 
   
 ∑     
          
 
   
 ∑     
                
 
   
 ∑     
          
 
   
      
 
Yes 
 
 Results 
 Selection of Models 
The first step is to select the models for comparison.  For each state, the model that does 
not allow for endogenous oil prices is the one out of M1 and M2 that has the lowest associated 
Akaike information criteria (AIC) value, while the model that allows for endogenous oil prices is 
the one out of M3 through M7 with the lowest AIC value.  The AIC for all models is reported in 
Table 3.2, with the selected models in boldface.  For a majority of states, the model with NOPI 
shocks was selected over the model with the change in the price of oil.  Among the models that 
allow the price of oil to be endogenous, M7, which includes the aggregate demand, oil supply, 
and precautionary oil demand shocks, is never selected.  The additional parameter estimation 
error from the larger model is never offset with a sufficiently large improvement in the fit.  We 
82 
 
note that the AIC is a criterion that is biased toward the selection of large models.
11
  In the vast 
majority of cases, the model selected is M5, which uses only the aggregate demand shock.
12
   
 J-test 
The J-test is a test of the null hypothesis that nothing is lost by ignoring the variables in 
model   when one is working with model  .  Assume the regressors in   are    and the 
regressors in   are   .  Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) recommended the following strategy: 
1.  Estimate the model  .  Get the fitted values of that model.  Call the fitted values 
  ̂.   
2. Estimate model   by regressing on    and   ̂.   
3. Do a t-test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on   ̂ is zero.  If you reject, 
conclude that the variables in    belong in  .   
For our analysis, we do two J-tests.  The first sets the null model   to be the model that does 
not have endogenous oil prices and the alternative model   to be the model that allows the 
price of oil to be endogenous.  The second switches   and  .  A rejection of the null 
hypothesis for the first comparison implies that allowing for endogeneity improves the fit of the 
output model for a particular state.  A rejection for the second comparison implies that something 
is lost by accounting for only some oil price movements.  
 The J-test results for each state are presented in Table 3.3.  Column 2 is the test statistic 
for the null hypothesis that the model with endogeneity contributes nothing to the model without 
endogeneity.  Column 3 is the test statistic for the converse.  For most states, we reject both null 
hypotheses.  The most basic interpretation of these results is that it is important to account for the 
behavior of oil prices when modeling state-level output.  The rejection of both null hypotheses 
for most states would not happen if there was not a strong relationship between the price of oil 
and output.  In addition, there are significant benefits to decomposing oil price movements into 
oil supply shocks and oil demand shocks.  It is necessary to use a joint model of oil price 
   
                                                 
11
 Andrews (1999) has shown that the AIC asymptotically overselects the number of regressors. 
12
 Using only the aggregate demand shock is not the same as using an index of world output for prediction. The 
aggregate demand shock is an identified VAR shock that requires data on the price and production of oil. M3 uses 
only the index of world output and is selected in only two cases. 
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Table 3.2  AIC for All Models 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
AK -4105.4 -4100.8 -4051.1 -4104.2 -4107.7 -4105.7 4104.9 
AL -4156.7 -4157.5 -4102.9 -4155.8 -4159 -4154.4 -4156.5 
AR -5669.4 -5668.6 -5595.8 -5667 -5668.9 -5669.6 -5654.9 
AZ -4031.1 -4031.3 -3981.3 -4030.6 -4028.4 -4031 -4021.8 
CA -4344.8 -4350.4 -4291.3 -4343.3 -4342.4 -4343.4 -4334.3 
CO -3884.1 -3880.8 -3827.3 -3879.7 -3883.8 -3879.7 -3877.4 
CT -4961.7 -4972.9 -4901.2 -4961.4 -4967.4 -4961.2 -4956.3 
DE -4954.5 -4956.3 -4908.8 -4956.6 -4953.3 -4954.5 -4952.1 
FL -4606 -4609.6 -4539.5 -4604 -4604 -4603 -4601.2 
GA -5292 -5293.9 -5227.2 -5297 -5296.1 -5291.9 -5292.9 
HI -4230.5 -4231.3 -4171.1 -4232.4 -4223.7 -4226.9 -4224 
IA -4219.8 -4222.6 -4165.9 -4220.5 -4227.4 -4217.4 -4224.5 
ID -5198 -5197.4 -5149.3 -5190.9 -5187.1 -5191.8 -5185.8 
IL -4148.5 -4150.4 -4110.2 -4150.5 -4161.6 -4146 -4151.9 
IN -4672.1 -4675.2 -4621.5 -4668.2 -4673.7 -4669.1 -4663.2 
KS -3833 -3831.6 -3787.9 -3830 -3845.2 -3828.6 -3832.4 
KY -5267.9 -5275.6 -5214.1 -5272 -5265.3 -5266.8 -5264.7 
LA -3402.5 -3409 -3357.4 -3399.2 -3410.6 -3401.3 -3401.6 
MA -4066.8 -4076.7 -4013.6 -4066.5 -4068.7 -4066.3 -4061 
MD -5543.6 -5541.9 -5479.1 -5540.1 -5543.7 -5542.1 -5535.2 
ME -3662.8 -3672.4 -3611.7 -3664.2 -3665.3 -3662.8 -3659 
MI -4303 -4306.4 -4255.5 -4296.5 -4304.2 -4303.9 -4293.8 
MN -3807.2 -3802.6 -3752.7 -3801 -3803.5 -3799.9 -3795.3 
MO -4403.8 -4411.2 -4351.6 -4403.2 -4414.1 -4403.9 -4404.6 
MS -3775 -3787.8 -3720.3 -3772.6 -3777.3 -3772.1 -3771.3 
MT -4478.2 -4472.5 -4424.2 -4470.7 -4471.8 -4472.9 -4466.7 
NC -4987.4 -4989.7 -4926.8 -4988 -4989.3 -4987.3 -4981 
ND -4982.9 -4984.7 -4925.8 -4977.9 -4980.4 -4981.8 -4977.1 
NE -3909.1 -3907 -3870.8 -3909.1 -3912.2 -3902.8 -3905.5 
NH -5470.1 -5471.6 -5402.2 -5473.6 -5475.2 -5470.8 -5464.1 
NJ -5263.5 -5266.8 -5212 -5266.1 -5263.8 -5263 -5255 
NM -4345.1 -4349.1 -4294.5 -4347.7 -4350.1 -4345.1 -4347.6 
NV -4922 -4918.5 -4860.4 -4915.2 -4912.5 -4914.3 -4905.1 
NY -5517.8 -5522.3 -5459.1 -5514.4 -5515 -5520.3 -5508.9 
OH -4243.7 -4253.5 -4215.8 -4243.3 -4249 -4241.1 -4240.3 
OK -3883.4 -3883.5 -3829.6 -3883.4 -3885.8 -3884.4 -3883 
OR -4784.1 -4780.1 -4733.5 -4776.9 -4786.2 -4774.9 -4777 
PA -3888.6 -3894.8 -3839.4 -3886.2 -3892.1 -3887.8 -3878.8 
RI -3981.1 -3990.5 -3929.1 -3981.6 -3981.7 -3981 -3974.6 
SC -4099.7 -4102.2 -4048.3 -4094.1 -4099 -4098.6 -4091.3 
SD -3931.9 -3930 -3891.9 -3928.4 -3930.6 -3929.2 -3928.5 
TN -5225.1 -5227 -5157.9 -5229.9 -5227.7 -5222 -5226.3 
TX -5707.4 -5706.3 -5637.9 -5713.3 -5716.4 -5708.1 -5709.9 
UT -4929 -4933.9 -4867.3 -4927.7 -4926.6 -4926.6 -4924.2 
VA -5100 -5105.4 -5036.3 -5097 -5097.7 -5099.4 -5095.3 
VT -4043.3 -4049.8 -3996.1 -4044.8 -4048.8 -4045.2 -4044.4 
WA -4061.8 -4059.6 -4016.6 -4054.4 -4058 -4059.4 -4053.8 
WI -5188.7 -5190 -5135.1 -5187.8 -5190.2 -5183.3 -5180.3 
WV -3342.4 -3333 -3302.1 -3336.5 -3336 -3337.8 -3335 
WY -3636.6 -3624.4 -3579.8 -3625 -3633.3 -3628.5 -3630.9 
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movements and world output as in Kilian (2009) in order to make full use of the information in 
oil prices.  We reject for most states the null hypothesis that a model with only oil demand 
shocks is sufficient for predicting output, suggesting the price of oil has value for predicting 
output beyond the aggregate demand shock.     
 The results in Table 3.3 do not provide any information about the economic significance 
of the differences in the models.  To capture that, we look at two measures of the effect on 
forecasts.  First, we report the mean absolute difference of (in-sample) predictions of the two 
models.  Second, we do out-of-sample forecast comparisons for the period 1996-2011 to see if 
one of the models would have systematically produced forecasts that were more accurate than 
the other.  We test for significance of the difference in mean squared forecast error (MSE) using 
the Diebold and Mariano (1995, DM) test.  
Figure 3.1 is a plot of the mean absolute difference in (in-sample) predictions of output 
for the two models, for each state.  There is much variation across states.  For some, like 
Arkansas, Maryland, Texas and New Hampshire, there are almost no differences in the 
predictions of the two models.  In other states, like Vermont, Wyoming and Louisiana, they are 
very different.  In the case of Louisiana, the two predictions differ, on average, by more than half 
a percentage point.   
 In Table 3.4 are the ratios of MSE for the two models and associated DM statistics at 
forecast horizons of h = 1, 3, and 12 months.  Suppose you have a vector     of forecast errors 
from model 1 and a vector    of forecast errors from model 2.  The loss differential series is 
defined by           .  The DM test is a test of the null hypothesis that the two models 
produce equally accurate forecasts.  It can be implemented by estimating the regression: 
        
and testing        .  Because the models are nonnested, that hypothesis can be tested using 
the Newey-West t-statistic for  ̂ (West 1996).   
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Table 3.3  Economic Activity: J-test  
State Adding Endogeneity Adding Oil 
AK 2.33 2.16 
AL 1.13 4.44 
AR 1.79 0.64 
AZ 2.36 2 
CA 1.32 3.52 
CO 3.89 2.05 
CT 2.1 4.09 
DE 3.04 3.21 
FL 1.23 2.86 
GA 2.55 2.23 
HI 4.29 4.19 
IA 2.96 3.45 
ID 0.76 3.38 
IL 3.87 2.51 
IN 2.19 2.44 
KS 1.99 1.27 
KY 2.54 4.45 
LA 2.23 1.07 
MA 1.49 3.97 
MD 2.76 1.91 
ME 2.27 3.25 
MI 2.88 3.74 
MN 2.13 2.22 
MO 2.99 3.7 
MS 2.2 1.92 
MT 2.08 2.84 
NC 1.78 2.63 
ND 2.18 2.44 
NE 3.01 2.44 
NH 2.61 1.83 
NJ 1.98 1.65 
NM 2.81 2.47 
NV 1.42 2.79 
NY 2.75 3.26 
OH 3.45 2.97 
OK 1.57 0.39 
OR 3.83 2.96 
PA 1.87 3.75 
RI 1.08 3.49 
SC 2.21 3.65 
SD 1.37 1.9 
TN 2.98 3.46 
TX 3.6 1.34 
UT 2.6 7.48 
VA 1.25 5.3 
VT 6.72 4.1 
WA 1.38 2.05 
WI 2.38 3.13 
WV 0.85 1.9 
WY 2.82 2.85 
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Figure 3.1  Economic Activity: Mean Absolute Difference   
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 It is clear from Table 3.4 that the difference in forecast performance of two models is not 
statistically significant for most states.  In fact, over all three horizons, we reject the null 
hypothesis of equal predictive ability 5% of the time - exactly what we should expect under the 
null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy.  For almost all states and forecast horizons, the mean 
squared forecast error of the two models are within 10% of one another.  Overall, from an out-of-
sample forecasting perspective, it is hard to argue for one model over the other.  You do not lose 
anything by complicating the model to accommodate feedback from output to the price of oil, 
but at the same time, you do not gain anything.    
 This appears to conflict with the results of the J-tests reported in Table 3.3.
13
  Yet it is 
consistent with other results in the forecasting literature.  Improving out-of-sample forecasts is 
much more difficult than improving in-sample fit, due to parameter estimation error, structural 
instability, and model misspecification.  In-sample and out-of-sample predictability tests are 
distinct methods of model evaluation (see e.g. Inoue and Kilian (2005) and Campbell and 
Thompson (2008)).  It is not uncommon for significant in-sample predictability to not translate 
into improved out-of-sample forecasts. 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 and Figure 3.2 repeat the analysis substituting the unemployment rate 
for the economic activity index.  The results are similar to those for output.  In most cases, the J-
test rejects for both models.  There is much variation in the mean absolute difference of the 
model predictions.  The difference is close to zero in several states but greater than 0.7 
percentage points for Louisiana and Utah.  The out-of-sample forecasts have similar MSE and 
rarely does the DM test reject the null of equal predictive ability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Technically, that is not true. The J-test is analogous to a test for forecast encompassing (Fair and Shiller 1990). 
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Table 3.4  Economic Activity: OOS Forecast Evaluation  
State 
h=1 h=3 h=12 
MSE Ratio DM Statistic MSE Ratio DM Statistic MSE Ratio DM Statistic 
AK 1.01 0.24 1.15 1.17 0.98 -0.38 
AL 1.03 0.81 1.03 0.47 0.95 -1.58 
AR 1.02 0.65 1.1 1.31 0.96 -0.38 
AZ 0.92 -1.28 0.97 -0.41 0.95 -0.59 
CA 1.03 0.61 1.03 0.49 0.93 -1.81 
CO 1.05 0.68 1.15 1.07 0.95 -1.27 
CT 1.01 0.2 1.09 0.92 0.96 -1.52 
DE 1.4 2.57 1.03 0.66 1.03 0.92 
FL 0.98 -0.49 1 -0.12 0.91 -1.47 
GA 0.99 -0.2 0.96 -1.33 0.96 -1.78 
HI 1 0.27 1 0.04 0.95 -1.28 
IA 1.03 3.07 1 -0.13 1 0.03 
ID 1.04 0.92 1.01 0.24 1 0.13 
IL 1.1 1.61 1.12 1.44 0.99 -0.14 
IN 1.1 0.94 1.13 0.94 0.93 -2.2 
KS 1.04 0.37 1.05 0.41 1.03 1.25 
KY 1.01 0.13 1.04 0.34 0.99 -0.86 
LA 0.94 -0.99 0.95 -1.19 1.01 0.21 
MA 0.98 -0.47 0.99 -0.16 0.92 -2.59 
MD 1 0.02 1.03 0.68 1.03 1.5 
ME 1.07 0.77 1.18 1.14 1.03 1.3 
MI 1.03 0.79 1.13 1.43 1.03 1.12 
MN 1.11 1.45 1.17 1.57 1.03 0.61 
MO 1.05 0.72 1.04 0.49 1.02 1.04 
MS 0.96 -1.01 0.99 -0.52 1 -0.05 
MT 1.02 0.77 0.95 -1.11 0.91 -1.59 
NC 1.02 0.23 1.11 0.85 0.97 -1.67 
ND 1.05 1.46 1.2 2.03 1.05 1.12 
NE 1.06 0.99 1.09 0.9 1.06 1.72 
NH 1.01 0.27 1.09 1.55 0.95 -1.99 
NJ 1.02 0.3 1.08 0.96 0.99 -0.38 
NM 0.97 -0.63 0.97 -0.5 1.02 0.56 
NV 1.01 0.19 0.95 -0.76 0.9 -0.69 
NY 1.04 0.71 1.24 2.18 0.93 -1.74 
OH 1.02 0.26 1.09 0.76 0.96 -0.18 
OK 1.05 0.62 1.05 0.6 1.03 0.15 
OR 1.06 1.07 1.02 0.33 0.95 -0.54 
PA 0.94 -0.91 0.98 -0.25 0.83 -2.14 
RI 0.99 -0.53 0.99 -0.45 0.91 -1.85 
SC 1.1 1.73 1.12 1.53 0.97 -0.79 
SD 1.05 0.55 1.11 1.03 1.02 1.47 
TN 1.14 1.44 1.17 1.38 0.96 -1.29 
TX 1.04 1.18 1.04 0.67 0.97 -0.21 
UT 1.06 0.5 0.93 -1.26 0.94 -0.77 
VA 1 -0.05 1.09 0.81 0.92 -1.53 
VT 1.13 1.4 1.25 1.3 1.09 1.18 
WA 1.12 1.28 1.2 1.61 0.92 -1.3 
WI 0.72 -1.78 0.94 -0.5 0.86 -1.62 
WV 0.97 -0.77 0.94 -0.87 0.86 -0.61 
WY 1.04 0.78 0.94 -0.54 0.99 -0.03 
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Table 3.5  Unemployment: J-test 
State Adding Endogeneity Adding Oil 
AK 2.03 3.12 
AL 2.54 4.02 
AR 1.63 2.02 
AZ 0.94 1.31 
CA 2.11 2.06 
CO 4.83 2.47 
CT 1.93 3.88 
DE 1.24 1.32 
FL 2.29 2.68 
GA 1.42 2.55 
HI 2.86 1.94 
IA 1.79 2.24 
ID 2.44 2.73 
IL 5.22 1.47 
IN 2.26 2.54 
KS 1.95 0.75 
KY 4.19 5.88 
LA 0.72 1.21 
MA 2.80 4.10 
MD 2.70 1.95 
ME 2.06 5.37 
MI 3.34 2.95 
MN 3.05 1.02 
MO 2.29 0.95 
MS 1.86 1.51 
MT 3.42 1.25 
NC 3.06 2.87 
ND 3.94 2.89 
NE 3.80 0.97 
NH 1.51 2.77 
NJ 3.74 1.85 
NM 2.55 2.54 
NV 4.01 2.83 
NY 1.84 2.65 
OH 1.77 2.89 
OK 4.42 5.34 
OR 7.28 4.83 
PA 1.88 2.96 
RI 1.72 2.05 
SC 5.68 1.90 
SD 2.18 1.30 
TN 3.66 2.59 
TX 2.31 1.43 
UT 1.94 1.37 
VA 3.98 2.59 
VT 3.10 3.49 
WA 3.03 1.47 
WI 3.68 1.74 
WV 2.90 3.26 
WY 2.80 2.12 
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Table 3.6  Unemployment:  OOS Forecast Evaluation 
 
h=1 h=3 h=12 
State MSE Ratio DM Statistic MSE Ratio DM Statistic MSE Ratio DM Statistic 
AK 1.01 0.24 1.15 1.17 0.98 -0.38 
AL 1.03 0.81 1.03 0.47 0.95 -1.58 
AR 1.02 0.65 1.1 1.31 0.96 -0.38 
AZ 0.92 -1.28 0.97 -0.41 0.95 -0.59 
CA 1.03 0.61 1.03 0.49 0.93 -1.81 
CO 1.05 0.68 1.15 1.07 0.95 -1.27 
CT 1.01 0.2 1.09 0.92 0.96 -1.52 
DE 1.4 2.57 1.03 0.66 1.03 0.92 
FL 0.98 -0.49 1 -0.12 0.91 -1.47 
GA 0.99 -0.2 0.96 -1.33 0.96 -1.78 
HI 1 0.27 1 0.04 0.95 -1.28 
IA 1.03 3.07 1 -0.13 1 0.03 
ID 1.04 0.92 1.01 0.24 1 0.13 
IL 1.1 1.61 1.12 1.44 0.99 -0.14 
IN 1.1 0.94 1.13 0.94 0.93 -2.2 
KS 1.04 0.37 1.05 0.41 1.03 1.25 
KY 1.01 0.13 1.04 0.34 0.99 -0.86 
LA 0.94 -0.99 0.95 -1.19 1.01 0.21 
MA 0.98 -0.47 0.99 -0.16 0.92 -2.59 
MD 1 0.02 1.03 0.68 1.03 1.5 
ME 1.07 0.77 1.18 1.14 1.03 1.3 
MI 1.03 0.79 1.13 1.43 1.03 1.12 
MN 1.11 1.45 1.17 1.57 1.03 0.61 
MO 1.05 0.72 1.04 0.49 1.02 1.04 
MS 0.96 -1.01 0.99 -0.52 1 -0.05 
MT 1.02 0.77 0.95 -1.11 0.91 -1.59 
NC 1.02 0.23 1.11 0.85 0.97 -1.67 
ND 1.05 1.46 1.2 2.03 1.05 1.12 
NE 1.06 0.99 1.09 0.9 1.06 1.72 
NH 1.01 0.27 1.09 1.55 0.95 -1.99 
NJ 1.02 0.3 1.08 0.96 0.99 -0.38 
NM 0.97 -0.63 0.97 -0.5 1.02 0.56 
NV 1.01 0.19 0.95 -0.76 0.9 -0.69 
NY 1.04 0.71 1.24 2.18 0.93 -1.74 
OH 1.02 0.26 1.09 0.76 0.96 -0.18 
OK 1.05 0.62 1.05 0.6 1.03 0.15 
OR 1.06 1.07 1.02 0.33 0.95 -0.54 
PA 0.94 -0.91 0.98 -0.25 0.83 -2.14 
RI 0.99 -0.53 0.99 -0.45 0.91 -1.85 
SC 1.1 1.73 1.12 1.53 0.97 -0.79 
SD 1.05 0.55 1.11 1.03 1.02 1.47 
TN 1.14 1.44 1.17 1.38 0.96 -1.29 
TX 1.04 1.18 1.04 0.67 0.97 -0.21 
UT 1.06 0.5 0.93 -1.26 0.94 -0.77 
VA 1 -0.05 1.09 0.81 0.92 -1.53 
VT 1.13 1.4 1.25 1.3 1.09 1.18 
WA 1.12 1.28 1.2 1.61 0.92 -1.3 
WI 0.72 -1.78 0.94 -0.5 0.86 -1.62 
WV 0.97 -0.77 0.94 -0.87 0.86 -0.61 
WY 1.04 0.78 0.94 -0.54 0.99 -0.03 
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Figure 3.2  Unemployment: Mean Absolute Difference 
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 Subsample Analysis 
It is implausible that oil price endogeneity is equally important for all observations.  
There is likely to be little benefit from accounting for endogeneity in times when oil price 
movements are the result of shocks to the supply of oil, as in 1979.  Working with the full 
sample may hide the importance of global aggregate demand shocks during time periods such as 
2004-2009.  This section redoes the analysis for two periods.  One is a group of oil market 
shocks that includes all observations from the years 1979-1980 (overthrow of the Shah in Iran), 
1985-1986 (the breakdown of the OPEC cartel and its aftermath), and 1990-1991 (first Gulf 
War).  The other is a period of global aggregate demand shocks from 2004-2009.
14
 
Table 3.7 shows J-test results for the two subsamples.  As expected, the J-test finds that 
the model with exogenous oil price shocks is important in periods with large oil market shocks.  
The J-test statistics in column 3 are larger than 1.96 for nearly all states, and in many cases, 
much larger.  On the other hand, for the 2004-2009 period, the null hypothesis that the model 
with endogenous oil prices contributes nothing is rejected for almost all states.  Many of the J-
test statistics for that comparison (column 4) are much larger than 1.96.  This supports the notion 
that the decision of whether or not one should account for endogeneity depends on the economic 
environment at that time. 
In Figure 3.3 and 3.4 are plots of the mean absolute differences of predictions for the two 
models over the two time periods.  Unlike the case for the full subsample, there are large 
differences in predictions for most states over the two time periods, particularly for the 2004-
2009 period which can be thought of as oil price shocks caused by a growing global economy.  
The decision to model oil price endogeneity matters much more in these two periods than for the 
rest of the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Kilian (2009, p. 1066) emphasizes the importance of identifying the causes of specific oil price movements. 
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Table 3.7  Subsample J-test 
 
Supply Shocks 2004-2009 
State Adding Endogeneity Adding Oil Adding Endogeneity Adding Oil 
AK 2.30 2.48 0.86 3.27 
AL 0.23 4.87 0.72 7.29 
AR 3.99 2.14 3.28 5.14 
AZ 3.51 5.06 3.59 1.97 
CA 1.86 2.32 3.19 2.48 
CO 2.88 1.37 2.65 1.71 
CT 0.59 4.24 4.42 3.90 
DE 1.92 0.84 3.48 2.44 
FL 1.01 7.58 3.98 2.30 
GA 1.62 0.92 5.56 2.31 
HI 2.15 6.70 3.56 2.76 
IA 1.13 1.64 4.36 1.65 
ID 1.77 3.48 2.27 2.82 
IL 4.35 1.30 4.82 2.48 
IN 3.01 1.10 2.31 1.81 
KS 0.49 1.91 2.10 2.46 
KY 2.78 5.11 4.49 5.45 
LA 2.91 1.52 1.93 1.20 
MA 1.95 3.19 1.51 2.48 
MD 1.97 4.34 2.57 1.60 
ME 3.81 2.49 1.94 4.00 
MI 1.97 2.59 2.31 2.83 
MN 2.97 7.45 9.90 3.57 
MO 1.54 2.80 3.35 1.89 
MS 0.99 1.88 2.21 2.15 
MT 0.71 0.82 1.42 2.59 
NC 2.31 1.30 3.17 1.29 
ND 3.64 2.03 3.49 1.35 
NE 2.34 1.75 3.49 2.39 
NH 2.33 5.02 4.29 2.61 
NJ 2.89 1.58 2.29 2.18 
NM 6.65 2.32 2.91 2.60 
NV 2.83 1.91 1.97 2.89 
NY 4.67 6.37 3.17 1.31 
OH 2.03 1.93 1.39 2.43 
OK 4.18 -0.17 1.42 0.39 
OR 1.43 0.98 7.11 2.15 
PA 1.65 2.07 2.54 2.15 
RI 1.19 3.10 3.44 2.01 
SC 2.63 2.32 6.40 2.26 
SD 1.86 1.27 2.22 1.87 
TN 1.31 2.09 2.30 1.49 
TX 1.88 2.81 5.08 1.08 
UT 2.82 3.18 1.81 2.58 
VA 1.76 3.72 3.33 2.15 
VT 2.26 5.99 4.25 5.14 
WA 5.45 1.50 3.02 3.50 
WI 0.69 4.19 4.57 2.93 
WV 2.52 2.63 3.64 0.54 
WY 4.07 2.71 2.97 6.83 
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Figure 3.3  Subsample Supply Shocks: Mean Absolute Difference  
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Figure 3.4  Subsample 2004-2009: Mean Absolute Difference 
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 Conclusion 
This essay has evaluated the performance of models of state-level output that explicitly 
model the feedback from output to the price of oil.  The results are heavily dependent on the 
choice of in-sample fit versus out-of-sample forecast accuracy as the relevant metric.  In terms of 
in-sample fit, and consistent with Kilian (2009), we conclude that it is better in most cases to 
construct a more complicated model of output that decomposes oil price movements into world 
aggregate demand, oil supply, and oil market shocks.  On the other hand, when the models are 
judged on the basis of out-of-sample forecast accuracy, there is rarely an advantage to using the 
more complicated model - a simple model that includes only the change in the price of oil 
delivers forecasts that are just as accurate. 
A subsample analysis looked at the predictions of state-level output in periods with large 
oil market shocks and large aggregate demand shocks.  In line with expectations, we found that 
the oil price change is a valuable predictor in the first subsample, and the endogenous oil 
movement is a valuable predictor in the second subsample. 
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Appendix A - Chapter 2 
 Unemployment DM Tests 
 
Table A.1  DM Test (U) - Oil vs Gasoline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2  DM Test (U) - Oil vs Diesel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3  DM Test (U) - Oil vs Natural Gas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 
h = 3 WI MA* 
h = 6 - MA, ND 
h = 12 - GA*, MA*, NY* 
 1 3 
h = 3 NJ, WV - 
h = 6 NJ*, WA, WV ID* 
h = 12 HI*, IA IL 
 1 4 
h = 3 
CA*, DE, GA*, ID*, MO*, NV, 
PA, SD* 
- 
h = 6 
AR, DE, GA, HI, ID*, IN, MT*, 
NC*, NV*, PA 
MA* 
h = 12 
AR, GA, MO*, OH, PA, TX*, 
WV 
- 
101 
 
Table A.4  DM Test (U) - Oil vs Heating Oil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5  DM Test (U) - Oil vs Electricity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 5 
h = 3 DE, NY*, WV*, WY* SC* 
h = 6 DE, MT, OK, WY TN* 
h = 12 MD, ME, RI 
AK*, IA*, MA*, 
NV* 
 1 6 
h = 3 AZ, CA, DE, GA*, NC, OK, WV* - 
h = 6 
AZ, CA*, CO, DE, GA, IN, MO, NC, 
NY, OK, PA* 
- 
h = 12 GA, KS, TX, WA - 
